


Infantry

September-October 2004



Information Warfare (Page 1)

So, You're Going to Iraq? Company Commander Shares Successful Tactics, Techniques (Page 23)

Shoulder Patches - Identification for the Future Brigades (Page 29)



BG BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY
Commandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor

MICHELLE J. ROWAN
Deputy Editor


BETTY J. BYRD
Editorial Assistant

FRONT COVER:

Soldiers with the 2nd Brigade Reconnaissance Troop wait for extraction by a UH-60 Black Hawk after receiving mortar and small arms fire during a Quick Reaction Force weapons interdiction mission in Iraq. (Photo by Tech Sergeant Scott Reed, USAF)

BACK COVER:

Specialist Christopher Poe, an M203 gunner for Task Force 1-21 Infantry, provides security while displaced Kurds chalk out a line representing camp boundaries in Kirkuk, Iraq, August 20. (Photo by Specialist Sean Kimmons.)



This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Peter J. Schoomaker
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

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Secretary of the Army
0423301

Distribution: Special

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Infantry

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004

Volume 93, Number 5

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• **INFANTRY** (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, **INFANTRY**, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail rowanm@benning.army.mil. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. • **POSTMASTER:** Send address changes to **INFANTRY**, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • USPS Publication No. 370630.


Commandant's Note

BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

INFORMATION WARFARE The Next Dimension

Information warfare has existed as long as man has waged war. The information war burgeoned during World War II, when the keepers of the information key were the cryptographers, for it was they who both encoded our own operational documents and decoded those of the enemy. Captured German and Japanese naval codes enabled America and the Allies to read our adversaries' mail, as it were, for a long time, and the information gained led to victories on the ground, in the air, and at sea. The massive British effort on the Ultra Project laid bare the Germans' main cryptographic system, saved countless lives from D-Day forward, and set the stage for major defeats of German forces. Conversely, denial of intercept traffic caused us to be caught off guard. As U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman pointed out in an address called *Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of War*, "...the Germans gained tactical surprise at the Battle of the Bulge by shutting down the communications lines we had tapped. They had gone to other tactical comm[unication] systems to send messages. And our lack of information played a role in the Germans' success."

The importance of a synchronized, executable information operation is as critical today as it was during World War II. In fact, a common theme in our lessons learned conferences, work groups, panels, and visits is that we are continuing to struggle with the definition, planning, and execution of information warfare in current operations. In Iraq, the impact of the 11 critical variables of the contemporary operating environment on the population has been particularly illustrative and has been magnified by information efforts that support the disparate agendas of the multiple enemies of stability. Both the noncompliant forces and the Coalition depend on the host nation's population for labor, security, intelligence, and — most importantly — legitimacy. Failures in information operations can have a devastating effect on these efforts.



Our adversary plans and fights asymmetrically. In order to stem the tide of insurgent attacks and win the support of the population, we must become equally asymmetric. We must communicate our intentions and counter the enemy's propaganda machine to further stability efforts, gather intelligence, and deny the enemy the means of waging war. One initiative might be to position forward operating bases away from host nation population centers to reduce the perception that we are an occupying power. Such a move diminishes perceptions of a disparity between our lifestyle and that of the host population. Likewise, it will reduce the vulnerability our forward operating bases have experienced with mortar attacks, vehicle-borne explosive devices, OPSEC, and disinformation. This initiative, and the many others like it, developed by agile thinking and adaptive commanders helps us isolate this parasite-like enemy that terrorizes and misleads the population in order to gain support for his agenda.

Let there be no doubt that we are fighting an adaptable and cunning enemy. He has transitioned from cell phones to sermons to graffiti as a means to communicate with his followers. In Iraq, we have undertaken civic action projects and erected signs to show U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to improve citizens' quality of life. The insurgents, in turn, have resorted to the simple expedient of painting over these signs and claiming credit for the work themselves. We must quickly identify the information efforts of the enemy in order to alter their effect and exploit them in our favor if possible. Commanders must synchronize their civil affairs, security, public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), intelligence and cultural support assets available to gain the effect desired in our battlespace. Too often we're finding efforts to use informational power uncoordinated. For instance, during Operation Iraqi Freedom we had an incident of an airborne radio broadcasting platform enticing Iraqi citizens to come out of their homes to celebrate their freedom, while the ground maneuver

commander was using his PSYOPS detachment to tell noncombatants to stay indoors to avoid being mistaken for enemy combatants. We must also recognize and mitigate the unintended second and third-order effects of all our kinetic and non-kinetic actions directed against the enemies of democracy inside and outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Two examples of how we can achieve this are providing commanders with nonlethal technologies and more precision munition options to minimize collateral personnel or material damage. These efforts give commanders on the ground options to shape public opinion derived by some of our necessary kinetic actions. Specifically, we must avoid information fratricide by working with our sister services, allies, and other agencies to provide the commanders both material and nonmaterial solutions to our information management dilemmas. At a minimum, we must identify the informational fratricide risks in our actions and mitigate their adverse impacts. In addition to synchronizing our internal PSYOPS, PAO, and Intelligence efforts in our own formations, we must coordinate and synchronize the efforts of everyone in our AO. This includes our sister services, governmental and non-governmental agencies, international agencies, and host nation forces. Unity of command and unity of effort within each commander's battlespace is the objective.

The Afghan insurgents' ability to capitalize on our information miscues — albeit somewhat unsophisticated — can be effective. Recently, U.S. units raided and seized an enemy facility disguised as an Islamic school, or Madrassa, capturing weapons, documents, and enemy personnel. Seizure of the structure required force entry techniques, which damaged the door. When U.S. forces later returned to the site, the door had been repaired and insurgents were undoubtedly propagating the belief that the U.S. destroys schools, while they care enough to repair them. To be sure, such incidents are only skirmishes in the information war, but we must deny the enemy every opportunity to present America and her

armed forces in a negative context. We employ footage of large scale operations to illustrate our commitment and preponderance of force, while he claims it to be arbitrary violence of an occupying force. The enemy violates generally accepted rules of war by militarizing religious facilities and storing weapons, ammunition, and explosives in them, but local media assail us for returning fire against such facilities or discovering and publicizing such violations. Quickly acting and reacting to these allegations is essential, but our information operations must not be limited to minimizing the effects of enemy attacks; we are doing far too many positive things in the nations where we are deployed to let them go unreported. We have to tell our story. The Army and Marine Corps work with imbedded reporting is one example of how to show our point of view where previously our media was steered by the agenda of others. While it is important for our audience here at home to see the positive, progressive aspect of operations overseas, it is equally important that the people of Iraq and Afghanistan and those of the region understand the magnitude of our commitment. Similarly, we must demonstrate our resolve through every informational means available to show our adversaries that we are in the fight for the long haul and that it is costly if he persists in pursuing his illegitimate agenda.

Information operations are a combat multiplier that we must employ if we are to engage and defeat an enemy whose ability to fight asymmetrically may well be his greatest — and perhaps only — advantage. We must integrate all of our assets into our operations, consider their consequences, and synchronize our efforts. We are fast learners, and our success in seizing and retaining the initiative in this dimension of combat is limited only by our own imagination. Learn from an imaginative and resourceful enemy; study what he has done up to now, but look as well for the things he has not yet tried.

Follow me!

A PSYOPS Soldier hands out newspapers during a patrol in Mosul, Iraq.

Sergeant Jeremiah Johnson





‘Infantry In Battle’

Infantry in Action From Somalia to Iraq

Friends of the Infantry, we are working on an effort to produce an updated “George Marshall” type *Infantry in Battle*, focused on today’s actions. The readers will be tomorrow’s NCO and officer leadership, discovering some of the “truths” relating to fighting and leading America’s Soldiers. We need your help!! Please see the topical areas listed below and have your leaders send us their experiences grouped under the topics. If you have other ideas, let us know as well. We look forward to your engaging in this exciting endeavor.

For more information, please contact Mr. Dave Stiegman; e-mail is Stiegman@benning.army.mil, phone (706)-545-4290/DSN 835-4290.

All the best and thank you for your leadership! Follow Me!

— BG Benjamin C. Freakley
Chief of Infantry

The Infantry School at Fort Benning is working on a modern-day version of the 1934, post-WWI “Infantry in Battle”. The goal is for Soldiers to learn from the actions of infantrymen and infantry units, over the full spectrum of combat operations, from the conflict in Somalia to present day. A critical component of the project is the “infantryman’s point of view” about his actions, without which the book would lack perspective. The challenge is to capture the finest accounts of infantry actions resulting from recent operations. We are therefore enlisting the help of commanders in the field to aid us in gathering the best stories, interviews, and personal monographs of the leaders and Soldiers who do the fighting.

All infantrymen have a vested interest in the final product as a book by infantrymen, for infantrymen.

The intent is to fill out the chapters with the most concise, yet hard-hitting, personal accounts of battlefield situations to drive home the themes of the book. We are equally interested in both successes and failures: historically, we have learned as much or more from failure as from success. The 20 chapter titles listed below, with descriptions, are the themes selected to best describe infantrymen and infantry teams. We are looking for written vignettes and monographs by individual Soldiers detailing personal actions or observations occurring in operations that clearly illustrate one or more of these themes.

Discipline: The basic quality that guides a Soldier’s actions through the stress of combat and, particularly in the face of overwhelming odds, causes the Soldier to fight as he is trained to fight. A lack of discipline leads to a compromise of standards and values.

Fitness: Those aspects of a Soldier’s mental and physical fitness that harden him, keep him alive and in the fight, and allow him to focus his energy on mission accomplishment. An inadequate level of fitness distracts a Soldier from his mission, and limits his contribution to the team.

Marksmanship: The critical advantage of having individual Soldiers that can provide accurate long-range or reflexive short-range fire, and teams/crews that

employ disciplined, controlled fires against an enemy force.

Mutual Support Teamwork:

The support which units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

Why Men Fight:

The forces that draw men together as teams, and impel them through the rigors of combat, not only because of duty or discipline, but because of much closer and more basic bonds of trust in the unit, the leaders, and each other.

Adaptability: The ability of Soldiers to display mental agility in order to adjust to new challenges arising on the dynamic modern battlefield.

Ingenuity: The development of new and varied tactics and techniques, or the innovative use of existing assets to facilitate mission accomplishment.

Patrolling: Tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting mounted and dismounted patrols in varying environments facing an adaptable and resourceful enemy.

Use of Terrain: The use of terrain, effectively or ineffectively, that has a marked impact on the outcome of a mission or engagement.

Reporting: The passing of reliable, actionable information to allow commanders and staffs to see and understand situations first and realize the negative results of inaccurate reporting.

Security: The importance of strict measures taken to protect the force from



surprise hostile actions, and situations when a break down in security, at any level, negatively impacts the unit.

□ **Civilian Considerations:** Ability of Soldiers to gauge the feelings and intent of a local populace and capitalize on a particular area or ethnic group's beliefs and feelings.

□ **Embedded Personnel:** Journalists, Department of the Army civilians, other government agencies, non-government organizations, attachments or any person (nonmilitary) that is placed into a unit, especially while on combat operations.

□ **Reconnaissance:** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area or enemy.

□ **Dealing with Indigenous Forces:** Any action dealing with native military forces in a joint/symbiotic (cooperative) manner.

□ **Dealing with casualties:** The timely evacuation and treatment of combatants and noncombatants, friendly, enemy and indigenous.

□ **Rules of Engagement:** Directives issued by competent military authority which delineates the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

□ **Initiative:** The ability to set or change the terms of battle; implies an offensive spirit.

□ **Combined Arms:** The synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms, such as Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery, to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used on the enemy in sequence.

□ **U.S. Army Values:** Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage.

We are looking for "ground truth" accounts and observations as seen and told by infantrymen. There is no specific format for these, but we request that any written products submitted include some brief background on the situation, the identity of the author/s, and the unit at the time of the action. In addition to printed accounts it may be necessary for us to directly contact individuals submitting material for consideration, in order to clarify facts or gain further information. Materials currently under consideration vary in length from one to several pages, and describe a variety of actions ranging from individual actions, to battalion and brigade level engagements.

For more information, contact David S. Stieghan at (706)545-4290/6278, DSN 835-4290/6278 or via e-mail at stieghand@benning.army.mil.

Handheld Digital Assistants Hit Battlefield

JENNIFER SOWELL, ARMY NEWS SERVICE

Technology that has been available on Soldiers' vehicles since the early '90s is now being designed into a portable device.

The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Commander's Digital Assistant, known as the FBCB2-CDA, can be used all over the battlefield to track Soldiers, map the battlefield, and send digital messages.

"A unit with the XVIII Airborne Corps is currently training with the latest generation of the device," said Lieutenant Colonel David Gallop, product manager for Land Warrior. "They will deploy in the fall with about 1,000 devices to gather information on insurgents."

User evaluations from this use in the field will be used to make adjustments and develop the next generation of the device, which will become common software for all land forces within the Department of Defense.

"Until recently there was no powerful, affordable and portable processing abilities available," said Gallop. "This new technology puts battle command in the Soldier's hand."

The device is a portable, ruggedized digital information system designed to give commanders, leaders, and Soldiers across the battlefield improved command and control capabilities, data sharing, and enhanced situational awareness.

The lightweight, handheld device operates on an Intel X-scale 500+ MHz processor and uses satellites that enable over-the-horizon communications, an integrated global positioning system and Blue Force Tracking to map the battlefield. Each device is networked so that all Soldiers are working off the same information.

Soldiers use drop-down menus on a color, LCD touch screen operating on a Microsoft Windows system for compact devices to use the many features of the



Jennifer Sowell

The FBCB2-CDA can be used all over the battlefield to track Soldiers, map the battlefield, and send digital messages.

device. These features include sending digital and voice messages and reports, requesting support at specific locations, mapping the area with locations of friendly forces, and using information provided by other Soldiers in the system to plan movements and operations.

The device also has the capability to be cleared quickly by the Soldier or remotely to protect operational security in case it falls into enemy hands.

"The device allows Soldiers to get messages across with speed and precision. It helps cut through the fog of war," said Gallop.

The FBCB2-CDA enables Soldiers all over the battlefield to share and view information that is linked to show relationships without filtering anything out, constructing an overall picture of the battlefield. For example, a Soldier spots a sniper in his area. The location of the enemy can be entered into the CDA where it is immediately accessible to all Soldiers with the device. Other Soldiers now know to be aware of the enemy in that location and can plan to avoid the area, or eliminate the threat.

2-29 Infantry Creates Combat Leader's Course



LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK L. EDMONDS

On March 23, 2003, Iraqi forces killed or captured 17 members of the 507th Maintenance Company in a hasty ambush after part of the company was separated from the main body of the air defense artillery battalion they were tasked to support. The results of the ensuing investigation led Army leaders to the conclusion that we need to improve on training all Soldiers in basic infantry skills through a focus on the new 40 Warrior Tasks and nine Warrior Drills, thus inculcating the Warrior Ethos across the force, regardless of military occupational speciality (MOS).

It was determined that the best way to indoctrinate young Soldiers with the Warrior Ethos and train them on infantry skills was to incorporate the "40 and 9" into Initial Entry Training for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) MOSs. In order to do this, the drill sergeants charged with training our new Soldiers must first be proficient at these tasks. With that in mind, the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning was charged with developing a course to train CS and CSS drill instructors on infantry skills using these new tasks and drills as the vehicle. The result was the formulation of the Combat Leader's Course (CLC). The first three-week long pilot course was run in March 2004, with mixed results. All agreed that the "40 and 9" were to remain the pillar of the course. During this first pilot, there were 62 students consisting of NCOs from Fort Jackson, Fort Sill, Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and ROTC Cadet Command. The course concluded with a culminating exercise that included a convoy reacting to improvised explosive devices. This first pilot identified that students needed more training in small unit tactics, individual tasks, field craft, and land navigation. We also determined that the course should include more field time

and all pertinent tasks could be accomplished in 13 days of continuous training.

After incorporating lessons learned from the first pilot, a second pilot was conducted, again using predominantly CS and CSS drill instructors. During this pilot, the cadre incorporated squad integrity with rotating leadership responsibilities. This served to build esprit de corps and facilitated the development and rehearsal of squad SOPs. The significant change was that the students spent more than 85 percent of their time in the field which enhanced the training in both tasks and field craft. Additionally, a day and night battle march and shoot utilizing a majority of Advanced Infantry Marksmanship Strategies and Standards (AIMSS) equipment was incorporated. As in the first pilot, the culminating event was a convoy live-fire exercise which enabled the students to utilize the SOPs and Warrior Drills they had been taught.

As we move forward to validate the program of instruction (POI) developed by the Infantry School, we're incorporating all lessons learned and field feedback as we execute the third and final CLC pilot 12-24 September 04. The terminal learning objective of which is "to provide NCO's serving in a BCT assignment the requisite skills to implement the warrior ETHOS into their IET Platoons." The first of 10 scheduled courses is in November, and will serve to meet the Army Chief of Staff's intent that every Soldier is a Warrior; and that begins in Initial Entry Training.

By first training the trainers (BCT drill instructors), who then train the BCT Soldiers, the result will be Soldiers arriving to their first assignment with the requisite training and skills of the 40 Warrior Tasks and nine Warrior Drills.

Donovan Research Library Places Student Papers on Web

During your assignments at Fort Benning, do you remember reading AARs, command diaries, and firsthand battle accounts at the Donovan Research Library? The library, which is located in Infantry Hall, is currently in the midst of transitioning its massive 10,000-plus collection of student papers to digital format.

This collection includes after action reports, command diaries, case studies, battle accounts, and first hand experiences from U.S. Army personnel


during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and other conflicts following 1980.

It represents the intellectual talent of research and education that Soldiers receive from the faculty and staff at the U.S. Army Infantry School and its divisions. Prior to this effort, these materials were only accessible through on-site visits.

The collection is available online at www.infantry.army.mil/donovan/content/monograph.htm.

WARRANT OFFICERS NEEDED

The U.S. Army is looking for highly motivated Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen to fill its warrant officer ranks. Positions are open in all 45 specialties if you qualify. Applicants with less than 12 years active federal service (AFS) are encouraged to apply. For more information and all forms/documents required, visit www.usarec.army.mil/warrant or call (DSN) 536-0328/0466/0271.



CSA REVEALS UPDATED PROFESSIONAL READING LIST



"The Professional Reading List is a way for leaders at all levels to increase their understanding of our Army's history, the global strategic context, and the enduring lessons of war. The topics and time periods included in the books on this list are expansive and are intended to broaden each leader's knowledge and confidence. I challenge all leaders to make a focused, personal commitment to read, reflect, and learn about our profession and our world. Through the exercise of our minds, our Army will grow stronger."

— General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

Sublist 1 — For Cadets, Soldiers, and Junior NCOs

- *The Constitution of the United States* — Available at www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html
- *Centuries of Service: The U.S. Army 1775–2004* — David W. Hogan, Jr. (CMH Pub. 70–71–1) Available at www.army.mil/cmh/books/COS/index.htm
- *The Face of Battle* — John Keegan
- *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* — Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski
- *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* — Stephen E. Ambrose
- *We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young: Ia Drang — The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam* — LTG (Retired) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway
- *If You Survive: From Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge to the End of World War II, One American Officer's Riveting True Story* — George Wilson
- *Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific* — Eric M. Bergerud
- *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945* — Michael D. Doubler
- *Patton: A Genius for War* — Carlo D'Este
- *In the Company of Heroes* — Michael J. Durant

Sublist 2 — For Company-Grade Officers, WO1–CW3, and Company Cadre NCOs

- *America's First Battles: 1776–1965* — Edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft
- *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* — Ulysses S. Grant
- *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* —

Brian McAllister Linn

- *The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* — Edward M. Coffman
- *An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942–1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy* — Rick Atkinson
- *Company Commander* — Charles B. MacDonald
- *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* — Roy E. Appleman
- *Leadership: The Warrior's Art* — Christopher Kolenda
- *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam* — Peter S. Kindsvatter
- *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence, Art of Command Series* — Roger Nye
- *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century* — Bruce Berkowitz

Sublist 3— For Field-Grade Officers, CW4–CW5, and Senior NCOs

- *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* — Available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
- *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* — Available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/strategy>
- *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* — Rohan Gunaratna
- *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* — James McPherson
- *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* — Martin Van Creveld
- *George C. Marshall: Soldier–Statesman of the American Century* — Mark A. Stoler
- *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* — Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor
- *On Becoming a Leader* — Warren Bennis
- *On War* — Carl von Clausewitz, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret

- *The Art of War* — Sun Tzu, Translated by Samuel Griffith
- *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd Edition* — Michael I. Handel
- *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* — Samuel Huntington
- *The Future of the Army Profession* — Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, Project Directors

Sublist 4 — For Senior Leaders above Brigade Level

- *Thinking in Time* — Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest May
- *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* — Samuel Huntington
- *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* — Thomas Friedman
- *War in European History* — Michael Howard
- *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* — Edited by Peter Paret
- *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* — Edited by Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein
- *The Peloponnesian War* — Donald Kagan
- *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* — H. R. McMaster
- *Victory on the Potomac* — James R. Locher III
- *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050* — Edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray
- *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941* — Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets
- *Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* — Douglas A. Macgregor

U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

RECOMMENDED READING

Infantry Company Grade Leader Suggested Reading List

Lieutenants

Black Hawk Down; A Story of Modern War — Mark Bowden (1999)

Infantry in Battle — Infantry Journal Inc. Staff (1982 [1934])

American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam — Peter Kindsvatter (2003)

Once an Eagle — Anton Myrer (1997)

Forgotten Soldier — Guy Sajer (1986)

Fields of Fire — James Webb (1985)

If You Survive — George Wilson (1987)

Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army — George C. Wilson (1989)

Captains

Toward the Flame: A Memoir of World War I — Hervey Allen (2003)

This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness — T.R. Fehrenbach (1994).

The Mask of Command — John Keegan (1987)

Company Commander — Charles B. MacDonald (1947)

Men Against Fire; The Problem of Battle Command in Future War — S.L.A. Marshall (1947)

The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Mechanized Combat — James R. McDonough (1988)

We Were Soldiers Once...and Young — Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway (1992)

Attacks — Erwin Rommel (1979)

Alternates

On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War — Avraham Adan (1991)

Citizen Soldiers; The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge and the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 — Stephen Ambrose (1997)

Red Badge of Courage — Stephen Crane (1990). [Available free as an e-book at: <http://www.usmchq.com/ebookcategories/fiction2.html>]

Firepower in Limited War — Robert H. Scales (1995)

The Killer Angels — Michael Shaara (1974)

Command Sergeant Major's Infantry NCO Suggested Reading List

BNCO Reading List

Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest — Stephen E. Ambrose (1992)

A Short History of the NCO — L. R. Arms (1989)

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War — Mark Bowden (1999)

To Hell and Back — Audie Murphy (1983)

ANCOC Reading List

Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 — Stephen E. Ambrose (1997)

G Company's War; Two Personal Accounts of the Campaigns in Europe, 1944-1945 — Bruce E. Egger and Lee MacMillan Otts. Edited and with commentary by Paul Roley (1992)

Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army — Ernest F. Fisher, Jr. (1994)

We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young — Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway (1992)

Forgotten Soldier — Guy Sajer (1986)

Alternates

Through the Wheat; A Novel of the World War I Marines — Thomas Boyd (2000)

Soldiering: The Civil War Diary of Rice C. Bull, 123rd New York Volunteer Infantry — Rice C. Bull (1977)

A Doughboy with the Fighting Sixty-Ninth: A Remembrance of World War I — Albert Ettinger (1992)

The GI's War: The Story of American Soldiers in Europe in World War II — Edwin P. Hoyt (1988)

The G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II — Lee B. Kennett (1987)

The Diary of Alvin York — Alvin C. York. Online version of York's World War I diary with official reports and affidavits is available at www.acacia.pair.com/Acacia.Vignettes/the.Diary.of.Alvin.York.html

eArmyU Goes Armywide

Beginning October 1, access to the Army Continuing Education System's eArmyU program will be available to most active-duty enlisted Soldiers.

The Army launched eArmyU in 2001, to offer eligible enlisted Soldiers the opportunity to work toward a college degree or certificate online. The program began with selected installations and so far, more than 46,000 Soldiers have taken courses from 29 institutions.

With the program's expansion to the entire Army, the eArmyU "Technology Pack" or "laptop" option will be offered solely as a retention and readiness tool in support of Army Transformation and the Army Campaign Plan, officials said, by encouraging reenlistment into combat forces/operational units.

The eArmyU "no laptop" enrollment, now called "eCourse enrollment," will be offered to the majority of other active-duty Soldiers, officials said.

With eCourse enrollment, Soldiers use their personal computers to participate in the program on a course-by-course basis. There is no longer a service-remaining requirement with the eCourse option, officials said. However, they said Soldiers must have sufficient remaining time in service to complete the eArmyU course in which they are enrolling.

The Army-wide expansion of the program comes with some critical changes in Soldier enrollment eligibility, officials said.

Enrollment in eArmyU's "laptop" option (referred to as Technology Package) will be limited only to Soldiers who reenlist for assignment in a combat forces/operational unit.

To find out more about the Army-wide expansion, visit any installation's Education Center.

General information can also be found at www.earmyu.com or by calling the eArmyU Help Desk at 1-800-817-9990.

Highest Attrition Occurs in First Week of Ranger School

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DOUGLAS M. GREENWAY

“Not for the Weak or Fainthearted”

These words that are emblazoned on the front sign of Camp Rogers are one of the first things newly arrived students see as they enter the gates. Ranger School can't be fully recognized until it is experienced.

Ask any qualified Ranger and they will probably tell you many underestimate what is needed to get through just the first week. More than 60 percent of all Rangers that fail Ranger School fail in the first week. We have a maximum student load of 250 students, but we take up to 330 because we know statistically that we will lose almost one-third of the class in the “Ranger Assessment Phase” (RAP week).

RAP week events are not too difficult by themselves, but when you put them all together it is like a mini-Best Ranger competition.

RAP week events that must be passed are:

☐ PT test * (70 percent standards plus 6 chin-ups)

☐ Swim test* (15m swim, 15m blind drop, equipment removal)

☐ 5-mile run (8 min per mile / 40 min total)

☐ Land navigation* (5 out of 6 points needed)

☐ 2.5-mile buddy run (with boots / equip)

☐ Ranger Stakes*

☐ 14.5-mile road march (with 65 to 75 pounds total equip)

*Retests provided. (You don't want retest on any of these events because that is energy you may not have for other events.)

Other events conducted during this week include: water confidence training, Malvesti obstacle course, 17 hours of hand-to-hand and rifle bayonet training, pugil stick fighting, airborne refresher training and jump, prepping of gear, initial leadership classes, patrolling classes, and a lot of running and retesting.

Perhaps the most shocking thing for

most new Rangers is working 20-hour days nonstop for 61 days — the full length of the course without recycle. (The exception is an 8-hour break every three weeks if deserved. It has to be earned.) Getting no rest that first week makes many give in.

Food is the other condition that can break a Soldier's spirit. Rangers get three square meals a day and only two out in the field, but the average “Joe” before Ranger School isn't used to working 20-hour days. Many Rangers may also be used to eating junk food and other snacks in between meals before they began this course. They aren't going to get snacks for a long time. You can bet they are burning up everything they are eating and more. The fact is Ranger School is a great weight loss program. If you take a look at a graduating class, all you will see are fit, focused machines that would kill for a slice of pizza.

Attrition has always been an issue at Ranger School. Since its inception in 1950, each class typically loses about 50 percent of the students for one reason or another.



Total Ranger Class Attrition




Figure 1

The figures above show where most Rangers fall out of the Ranger course. Figure 1 shows where most students failed during classes from June 2002 to June 2004. RAP causes the most attrition, and then the rest is split up somewhat evenly by medical, other, and administrative or academic (patrols /peers) reasons.

Figure 2 is a breakdown of what events caused the most failures during RAP week. Usually 60 percent or more of each class will fail in one or more of these events.

The best source for success in the Ranger course is to put all future Ranger candidates through a "Pre-Ranger" course. Those courses tend to put much of the same vigor into a three-week package that Ranger School has and sometimes more. By attending a pre-Ranger course, students have a much higher chance of success. The pre-Ranger course may not only save the individual from recycle, it will also determine if the Soldier has the desire and

RAP Week Attrition




Figure 2

attitude to endure the course. This not only saves slots but also money.

The Ranger course tests the mettle and soul of a man's character. When you think you are finished and can't go on any further, you will have to find the will to go on. You will find that "can't" or "quit" will not be part of your vocabulary. The Ranger course sets you apart from those that "could not." So don't waste your time if you are weak or fainthearted.

Rangers are men that "Can!"

ITEMS OF INTEREST

Nomad Helmet Mounted Display

Giving leaders "out the hatch" situational awareness, the Nomad Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) by Microvision allows tank/vehicle commanders and other leaders access to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system and other vehicle displays without having to leave their hatch position to move inside the vehicle in order to view the displays.

The device provides electronic information that is visible under all lighting conditions while also being see-through.

About 100 Nomad HMD units were used by the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) in Iraq. Over the past two years, the display has also undergone field trials at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, with the 3-2 SBCT as well as the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT).

The systems used by the 3-2 (SBCT) consist of a display module attached to the helmet and a video control module mounted to the vehicle with a cable connected to the FBCB2 system. The systems in use by the 1-25 (SBCT) have been upgraded to provide the ability to switch between the FBCB2, thermal weapon display,



and thermal driver's display. Additional developments and improvements to the HMD display systems are forthcoming.

CamelBak CBR 4.0 Chem-Bio Reservoir

CamelBak® Products, LLC., recently announced the availability of its CBR 4.0, Chem-Bio Reservoir system to supply constant access to safe, clean water to personnel operating in hazardous chemical and biological environments.

The CBR 4.0, already operational in combat situations with U.S. Special Forces, was thoroughly field-tested at Fort Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center. CamelBak's CBR 4.0 represents more than five years of research and development that anticipated an increasing demand for hydration systems strong enough to survive the rigorous demands of combat use in chem-bio environments.



The CBR 4.0 fits into most CamelBak Maximum Gear hydration systems and is compatible with standard protective mask fittings used by military, first responders, and security personnel. The CBR 4.0 is proven to withstand exposure to hazardous toxins such as sarin nerve and mustard blister agents as well as Anthrax.



TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

Huddle Begins ISR Synchronization

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.R. SANDERSON
MAJOR JEROME T. SIBAYAN

Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, chief of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) Transformation Team, leads a team of seven officers at Fort Benning and eight officers and NCOs located at four TRADOC Forward Cells focused on coordinating, synchronizing and supervising doctrinal, training, organizational and leader development events associated with the transformation of all SBCTs.

“See First” means answering information requirements. The central element of the SBCT (as well as all of our newly designed brigades) is the change in how we make contact with our enemy. Although we have conceptualized for years about the potential of seeing the enemy from a distance and therefore turning old style movement to contact missions into deliberate attacks with no wasted organizational energy, we may now be on the verge of having that capability.

In the past, our doctrine focused on the step-wise process of first making contact, developing the situation, and then maneuvering our forces. The SBCT, however, is based on developing the situation out of contact and building an early understanding of that situation, moving the forces necessary, then making contact on our terms and finishing decisively. In effect, we are attempting to turn all attacks into deliberate attacks where we know the enemy’s strengths, disposition and composition, and most importantly his weaknesses prior to our main body crossing the line of departure.

The key SBCT task is to acquire information, transform the information into intelligence, and finally to transform the intelligence into situation understanding before we begin movement and/or maneuver of the main body. This is a tough task requiring a highly trained and skilled Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) planning staff. The internal ISR, based primarily on input from the reconnaissance squadron, organic scout platoons, and the external ISR, based on intelligence feeds from higher directly to the organic military intelligence (MI) company, contribute to the commander’s ability to visualize, describe, and direct forces as required. In essence, SBCTs have the organic resources available (as well as the organic ability to pull external information) to see and shape the enemy prior to the execution of decisive operations and in effect attempting to turn all attacks into deliberate attacks.

In the past, a common “baseline” used to determine the difference between a deliberate attack and a movement to contact was knowledge of 70 percent of the enemy disposition and

composition. If we had 70 percent or greater knowledge, we presumed ourselves to be planning for and conducting a deliberate attack. Conversely, if we had less than 70 percent we considered ourselves conducting a movement to contact and planned accordingly. Our reconnaissance success or failure then determined what our movement rates, formations, and movement techniques were going to be as well as our probable line of contact and when we would transition from movement to maneuver. With an entire squadron devoted to seeing the enemy and pulling the main force into decisive maneuver, coupled with the ability to pull critical information from higher on an as needed basis, we may be closer than ever to realizing this concept.

The creation of the SBCT reconnaissance squadron solves many existing intelligence collection challenges. The enhanced ability to focus collection efforts and rapidly share intelligence supports the commander’s ability to plan, prepare, and execute without losing energy and momentum during operations. Information technology enables commanders and their staffs to obtain unprecedented common operational pictures and to plan and execute follow-on missions in the midst of a current operation.

Perhaps the most significant change in the SBCT formation is the preponderance of intelligence and surveillance assets. Commanders have long recognized the need for organic reconnaissance capabilities at the brigade level. Doctrine continues to task brigades with planning and conducting ISR operations to gain information about the enemy. The creation of the SBCT organization with a reconnaissance squadron and military intelligence company gives SBCT commanders unprecedented situational awareness and situational understanding — hallmarks of SBCT operations.

One of the challenges for the SBCT commanders and staff is developing standard procedures as part of the military decision-making process (MDMP). A recommended part of the process is the ISR huddle. The SBCT receives warning orders and begins initial movement of reconnaissance forces in preparation of upcoming operations. Knowing what the ISR huddle is, its intent, the format and who should be in the huddle is important for officers and NCOs bound for SBCTs. The huddle is a meeting with all of the key players physically co-located.

The Pre-operation ISR Huddle

The ISR huddle is a proven technique for quickly beginning ISR synchronization. It can occur as early as receipt of the mission from higher headquarters, or as late as the conclusion of the formal

mission analysis brief. It is variable and METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, civilians) dependant. In a time constrained or fast developing situation, the huddle will go as early as the commander has enough information to give adequate guidance. The key determinant in deciding when to execute the huddle is the type and amount of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products developed by the staff from division or higher level warning orders. A trained staff will know what products the commander needs and when he needs them in the process. Most commanders will need as a minimum some key IPB products prior to initiation of the huddle. An example of this is the event template that will include potential movement times as well as initial named areas of interest (NAI) and other NAIs (or other recon objectives) tasked by higher headquarters. During the huddle, the SBCT commander can also begin to determine his initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Although this will be thoroughly staffed throughout the decision-making process, an initial cut on CCIR based upon his experience will greatly enhance the planning process and focus the staff planning.

The commander's initial integration concern will be priority intelligence requirements (PIR). He must have a clear understanding of what he knows and conversely does not know about the enemy. By prioritizing those things he does not know, he has provided focus for not only his staff but also for his recon squadron and MI company. By conducting this huddle with key leaders including the recon squadron commander and possibly the MI company commander, the SBCT commander begins immediate integration of his key ISR players and his staff.

Additional benefits of this "huddle" include:

- An immediate assessment of the mission by the two most experienced ISR commanders,

- An immediate assessment of the limitations and constraints of the upcoming mission with regards to reconnaissance as well as an assessment on the priorities placed upon known NAIs based upon the initial IPB products, and

- An initial synchronization of joint and organic fires available to the SBCT and



U.S. Army photo

The creation of the SBCT organization with a reconnaissance squadron and military intelligence company gives SBCT commanders unprecedented situational awareness and situational understanding — hallmarks of SBCT operations.

the recon squadron.

Getting the proper "stance" in terms of terrain management as well as movement sequence out of the area prior to continuing the mission. This is especially significant for the initial positioning of organic fires assets in order to provide immediate support for all elements within the SBCT.

The huddle also serves as the initiation of movement of the reconnaissance forces. This provides an additional measure of force protection to the SBCT by expanding the SBCT battlespace. It also begins to provide the SBCT main body with trafficability analysis data before the main body begins movement. This allows for parallel and collaborative planning at both the SBCT and recon squadron level.

In order for the ISR planning staff as well as the recon squadron and MI company to successfully meet the brigade commander's intent, the commanders and staff must first have an understanding of how the collected intelligence information will be used to develop the brigade's plan and to facilitate execution. Both the SBCT ISR planning staff and the recon squadron leadership must understand the three doctrinal concepts of employing the squadron. As with all terms used in our doctrinal language, these conceptual terms have precise meanings and all involved must have a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the terms in order to facilitate execution. Although we have used these conceptual terms in the past, this is

the first time they are formally written in our doctrine. ISR planners and executors must all have a common understanding of the terms and their meanings in order to meet the SBCT commander's intent. According to FM 3-20.96, a cavalry squadron (reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition) identifies the reconnaissance purposes for employment as — Reconnaissance Push, Command Push, and Reconnaissance Pull.

Reconnaissance Push — The recon squadron is deployed early in the planning process. The brigade staff uses the intelligence information collected to develop the plan. This purpose requires the brigade staff to develop facts and assumptions on the threat early enough to focus the squadron's effort. These facts and assumptions are generally based on threat templates, predictive analysis, and a thorough IPB. As the squadron confirms or denies these facts and assumptions, the information is reported back to the squadron staff, analyzed, and disseminated throughout the brigade and to the brigade staff in order to complete the plan. Reconnaissance push requires the brigade to develop a detailed ISR plan prior to the planning of the brigade's (main body) mission. The information must be gathered, analyzed, and reported in a timely manner in order to influence the brigade's planning process. The result of reconnaissance push operations is a detailed plan, based on reliable intelligence, for the employment

of the brigade. To be successful in a time-constrained environment, the staffs must dedicate enough time on ISR planning, and then use the intelligence information collected to develop or adjust their initial plan.

Command Push — This purpose is similar to reconnaissance push in that collected information is used to develop the brigade's plan. The difference is that the brigade staff develops several detailed courses of action (COAs) before the squadron deploys. The SBCT staff must also develop a detailed ISR plan, but the ISR plan is more directive in nature with associated recon NAIs and objectives that directly support the SBCT maneuver COAs. The recon squadron is deployed to gather detailed information based on the brigade commander's PIR. The brigade commander uses the information to select the appropriate COA — massing the brigade's strengths against the threat's weaknesses. This method also results in a detailed plan, based on reliable intelligence, for the employment of brigade.

Reconnaissance Pull — The brigade staff develops a flexible plan, based on several possible COAs, driven by the brigade commander's intent. In order to execute reconnaissance pull, the commander must ensure that all subordinates truly understand his intent for the operation as this type of operation calls for decentralized, but synchronized and integrated execution. The plan must allow for maximum flexibility as the squadron conducts reconnaissance and continually "pulls" the brigade's main body to a position of advantage against identified threat weaknesses. The brigade commander uses a series of decision points, based on the level of SU, to maneuver the brigade. This method does not alleviate the squadron commander and staff from planning reconnaissance operations. They must still focus the reconnaissance effort by providing the troops with reconnaissance objectives. The result of the planning process is a flexible plan, based on decision points, that allows the brigade commander to maneuver the brigade based on information/intelligence collected by the squadron and ISR assets in the brigade.

The objective of reconnaissance pull is to find weaknesses in threat dispositions that can be exploited by the main body. The recon squadron and other ISR assets are deployed over a broad area of operations (AO), which allows them to identify threat weaknesses to exploit and threat strengths to avoid. Reconnaissance determines which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the threat is strong and weak, and where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissance should pull the main body toward and along the path of least resistance. Once these have been identified, the SBCT commander exploits the situation by choosing a COA that allows his decisive operation to attack the threat's weaknesses and penetrate gaps in the threat's defense. He then commits forces to widen the gap and envelop the threat. The recon squadron and other ISR assets continue to move, avoiding threat strengths and "pulling" the SBCT deep into the threat's AO.

Reconnaissance pull is also valid in defensive operations. Reconnaissance determines which routes the threat is using, where the threat is weak, and where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissance enhances agility by identifying opportunities and pulling the SBCT along the path of least resistance to mass SBCT effects at the critical time and place.

It is easy to see that assumptions made early during an operation will have significant second and third order effects on the commitment of the main body of the SBCT and the outcome of

the operation. Having the right leaders in the ISR huddle is important to leveraging the full capabilities of the SBCT. The brigade commander will designate an ISR planning team, led by the brigade XO, which includes (at a minimum) representatives from the S2, S3, S4, S5 (civil affairs [when assigned]), and S6 (signal) sections; fire/effects coordination cell (FECC); Army airspace command and control (A2C2) cell; the reconnaissance squadron commander, XO, S3, or designated representatives; and the supporting MI company commander or XO. A key contribution of the recon squadron commander and staff to the brigade ISR planning is knowledge of what squadron intelligence assets (i.e., sensors) are available as well as their capabilities/limitations in acquiring needed intelligence.

ISR planning and execution are tough, challenging events. ISR is not a "come as you are" party. It must be trained and retrained with commanders and staff gaining an appreciation for the importance of the art and science of conducting the huddle. The huddle must become a team drill with subordinate commanders and staff efficiently and accurately understanding the SBCT commander's intent and quickly turn that intent into an executable reconnaissance operation. The end of the huddle (regardless of whether we conduct it prior to or after the mission analysis brief) signals the start of the ISR operation and platforms such as FBCB2 will allow the commanders and staff to continue to synchronize and coordinate the fight for information.

The goal of "See First" is to set the conditions for deliberate attacks. It is easy to argue that once either visual contact or direct fire contact is initiated, the enemy (who always has a vote) will reposition, thus placing the entire operation back into the movement to contact venue vice a deliberate attack. As with all combat operations, a thorough rehearsal coupled with adequate branch plans that are deep enough to cover the BLUFOR basic scheme of maneuver and fire distribution and control schematic will, as a minimum, allow BLUFOR to retain the tactical advantage.

ISR planning and execution are tough. ISR consistently challenges staff planning, coordination, and execution abilities. More often than not, when we fail in combat training center (CTC) rotational missions, there is a direct correlation to our lack of reconnaissance. The additional burden on staffs is that ISR is never ending; it is a continuous process requiring our fullest collective attention. Many staffs enjoy the thought of going to sleep once they have completed the orders process. This usually results in the opposing force (OPFOR) or enemy commander fighting your chemical officer who is the night battle captain in the tactical operations center (TOC); therefore it is imperative that we not stop the process after we produce the order but continue to monitor, supervise, and execute ISR operations. ISR planning and execution requires significant training and we only get out of it what we put in ... train recon as it will provide a significant payoff in combat operations. Good luck in your recon.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Sanderson is currently serving as chief of the SBCT Transformation Team at Fort Benning, Georgia. His last assignment was commander of the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment of the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Major Jerome T. Sibayan is currently serving as the doctrine officer of the SBCT Transformation Team. His previous assignments include serving with the 3rd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM



SOLDIER AS A SYSTEM Program Ensures Soldier Modernization

DAVID J. LIBERSAT

Soldiers continue to be our most deployed system during this Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). As such, we must ensure Soldiers deploying into harm's way are properly equipped and trained for the missions they must execute. To accomplish this, the Army has embraced the Soldier as a System (SaaS) integration concept and management strategy to ensure Soldier modernization. SaaS includes everything worn, carried, or consumed by the Soldier to include man-portable crew-served weapons and unit radios. The Soldier as a System program is recognized as the most important Soldier modernization effort in the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Today, more than 300 separate requirement documents drive the acquisition process for Soldier equipment. This is a sharp contrast to the current acquisition of major weapons systems. In July 2003, General Kevin P. Byrnes, the commanding general of TRADOC, directed a series of briefings to get his arms around Soldier requirements. The SaaS Integrated Concept Team (ICT) is depicted in Figure 1 and is comprised of representatives from Army organizations and sister services. The SaaS ICT prepared a series of briefings to the TRADOC commander resulting in the consolidation of Soldier requirements into six Soldier

Figure 1

SaaS Management Structure

SaaS ICT manages and integrates all Soldier system capability requirements across DOTMLPF

SaaS Tier 1 ICT Chair, CG, USAIC, Fort Benning

TRADOC Futures Center
CG, CAC, Fort Leavenworth
CG, USASOC, Fort Gordon
CG, USATC, Fort Eustis
CG, USATC, Fort Jackson
CG, USAIC, Fort Huachuca
CG, USAFAC, Fort Sill
CG, USACASCOM, Fort Lee
CG, USAAVNC, Fort Rucker
CG, AMEDD, Fort Sam Houston
CG, USAARMC, Fort Knox
CG, USAADAC, Fort Bliss
CG, MANCEN, Fort Leonard Wood
CG, QMS&C, Fort Lee
CG, OC&S, APG
CG, USASOC, Fort Bragg

Army Reserves
National Guard

Director, IMA
CG, RDECOM
Natick
ATEC

PEO Soldier
ARSTAFF
G3/G8/G4

Air Force
USMC Navy
Quantico
Marine Corps
Development
Center

Level 1 = General Officer Level
Level 2 = COL Level
Level 3 = Key Personnel/Action Officers

SaaS Capability Development Strategy




Figure 2

capability development documents (CDDs) named: **Core Soldier**, **Ground Soldier**, **Air Soldier**, **Mounted Soldier**, **Maneuver Support Soldier**, and **Maneuver Sustainment Soldier**.

This new process is a paradigm shift from the old requirements development process for Soldier modernization. The Core Soldier CDD captures the requirements for all Soldiers all of the time and establishes a foundation from which to add unique specific requirements for Ground, Air, Mounted, Maneuver Support or Maneuver Sustainment Soldiers. The ICT works through three levels of teams from action officer to general officer. Figure 2 depicts the role of the ICT and relationship to the Soldier CDDs.

The SaaS ICT began work to consolidate and align all current Soldier programs into each of the six CDDs. There are several efficiencies gained by this consolidation. First, it ensures that all Soldier requirements are aligned and integrated. The SaaS ICT developed three detailed matrices that achieved the following efficiencies:

■ Cross-walked military occupational specialties (MOSSs) to key performance parameters (KPPs) and attributes across each CDD;

■ Alignment of Soldier equipment to KPPs and attributes within each CDD and thereby establishing a proponent lead and consolidation of Soldier equipment; and

■ Cross-walked the CDDs against each other to prevent duplication of effort and to identify capability gaps not yet captured.

A secondary benefit of this approach is the consolidation of all Soldier equipment funding lines. Historically, Soldier programs competed with each other for funding in addition to competing with other weapon systems. This resulted in underfunded Soldier programs and equipment. This new approach makes it more difficult to use Soldier programs as bill payers for other weapon systems or programs. The goal of the Soldier as a System approach is to consolidate program management and funding of the entire system, similar to the acquisition strategies used for the Future Combat Systems (FCS) and Stryker.

The SaaS ICT is committed to remain connected to the Operational Army in order to identify Soldier requirements. Soldier feedback comes through several mediums to include direct e-mail from Soldiers deployed in the area of operation (AO), feedback from Soldier after action reports (AARs), and post-combat surveys from units returning from the AO, to name a few. The SaaS ICT validates these requirements and they are incorporated into one of the six Soldier CDDs. These requirements and capabilities are organized in the following six domains:

Lethality — The capability to detect, identify, counter, kill — or achieve desired effects against selected targets throughout the full spectrum of military operations, under all climatic conditions and in all operational environments.

Survivability — Provision of effective protection, countermeasures and survivability in the full spectrum of military operations under all climatic conditions in all operational environments. All Soldiers must be capable of defending themselves while doing their jobs, even if their jobs do not involve direct combat.

Mobility — Enhancement of movement, both mounted and dismounted,

maneuvers and performance of individual tasks across the full spectrum of military operations under all climatic conditions in all operational environments. This includes efforts to reduce the Soldier's load to the maximum extent possible.

Sustainability — The maintenance of healthy Soldiers, both physically and mentally, and the provision of equipment that is reliable and durable, enhances the autonomous ability to sustain effectiveness across the full spectrum and duration of military operations. When required, Soldiers must be resupplied under all climatic conditions and in all environments. This includes all the supplies, services, and maintenance required for Soldier care, use, or consumption.

Battle Command — An increased ability to receive, understand, and use information provided by the full spectrum of Battle Command tools and project possible outcomes or solutions is required. Improved Battle Command will provide an enhanced knowledge of individual tasks and missions, a more complete picture of the battlefield, and the ability for rapid exchange of pertinent information across the full spectrum of military operations under all climatic conditions and all environments.

Training — Soldier systems must incorporate an individual and collective training capability that supports live, virtual, and constructive training environments in the threshold and an embedded individual and collective training capability that supports live, virtual, and constructive training environments in the future force.

Rapid Fielding Initiative

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) created another paradigm shift in the manner in which we equip Soldiers. Historically, a Department of the Army Master Prioritization List (DAMPL) prioritized units for fielding of new equipment based on available funding. This created a cascading effect of equipping Soldiers. Soldiers who were the "first responders" were equipped first. Over time, this resulted in a huge gap between the "haves" and "have nots." This became a critical issue with the call up of Army Reserve and National Guard forces in support of the GWOT. As a result, senior

Figure 3

FY04 TF Soldier List

Soldier Mission Essential Equipment

- Black Fleece Bibs
- USSOCOM Silk Weight Underwear
- Hydration System
- Wiley-X Goggles
- Glove System
- Cold Weather Cap
- MOLLE and accessories
- AF Desert Flyers Boot
- Standard Army Desert Boot
- Individual Combat Shelter
- Multipurpose Tool
- COTS Socks (4 per)
- Coolmax/Polormax t-shirts
- Combat Belt

Force Protection/Mobility

- Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) and Accessories
- MICH Comms Systems and Accessories
- ICOM Repair Parts Kits
- Knee and Elbow Pads
- Haligan Tool
- Grappling Hooks
- Door Ram
- Battle Axe
- Fiber Optic Viewer
- Quickie Saw and Replacement Blades
- Modular Entry Tools
- Double Key - Cuff

Lethality

- Weapon Light
- 249 Rails
- 240 Rails
- M122/A1 Tripods
- Small Binoculars
- Viper (VECTOR 21/ Mark VII)
- Shotgun (Lightweight Shotgun System)
- Assault Ladder
- MBITR
- Light Weight GPS
- M4/M16 Magazines
- M249 Ammo Soft Pack
- M240 Combat Ammo Pack

Individual Weapons Optics

- Close Combat Optic (M68)
- ACOG (TA31F 4X)
- Machine Gun Optic (M145)

Army leadership sought ways to expedite the fielding of Soldier equipment.

The SaaS ICT, in coordination with Program Executive Office – Soldier (PEO-Soldier) validated Soldier requirements based on lessons learned in the AOR. Congressional support in the form of supplemental dollars provided the funding to procure and expedite fielding of Soldier equipment. This process is known as the Rapid Fielding Initiative or "RFI." The SaaS ICT continues to validate new

Figure 4

Basis of Issue FY 05-07

Core Soldier recommended issue

- Advanced Combat Helmet w/ accessories (ACH)
 - Knee and Elbow Pads
 - MOLLE Accessories
 - Ballistic Protection Goggles
 - Hydration System
 - Glove System
 - Cold Weather Cap
 - Army Combat Boot Temperate Weather (OEF)
 - Army Combat Boot Hot Weather (OIF)
 - COTS Socks (4 Per)
 - Moisture Wicking t-shirts (4 Per)
 - Combat Belt
 - Moisture Wicking Sports Bra (4 Per Female)
 - Emergency Bandage (Israeli Pressure Bandage to replace current bandage)
 - Interceptor Body Armor*
 - SAPI Plates*
- * Fielded in addition to RFI

Unit recommended issue

- MBITR
- MICH Communication System
- Weapon Light
- IR Strobe/Glint Tape
- Viper (Vector 21)/Mark VII
- One-Handed Tourniquet
- Flex Cuffs
- Modular Weapon System Kit
- Small Binoculars (M24)
- Chitosan Dressing (Medics/CLS)
- Back-up Iron Sight
- 3-point Sling
- Helmet Repair Kit
- Improved Cleaning Kit
- Modular Accessory Shotgun System
- Haligan Tool
- Grappling Hook
- Door Ram
- Fiber Optic Viewer
- Tactical Assault Ladder
- Modular Entry Tool Kit

Selected Soldier recommended issue

- MOLLE Accessories (Grenadier, Medic, Pistol, SAW Gunner)
- Close Combat Optic, M68
- TA 31F ACOG
- Machine Gun Optic, M145
- M249 Ammo Soft Pack
- M240B Combat Ammo Pack
- M249 Rail
- M249 Short Barrel
- M249 Collapsible Butt Stock
- M249 Spare Barrel Bag
- M240B Spare Barrel Bag
- M122A1 Lightweight Tripod
- M240B Rail
- M203 Day/Night Sight
- Night Vision Mono Lock (PVS14)
- Improved Spotting Scope w/ Tripod
- Improved Butt Stock (M4)
- Modular M9 Holster
- Forward Grip Bipod
- USSOCOM Silk Weight Underwear
- Black Fleece Bibs
- Black Fleece Jacket

requirements and make adjustments to the RFI list as capability gaps or new requirements are identified. PEO Soldier coordinates the funding, production, and fielding of equipment to our units and Soldiers. In total, PEO Soldier will field 840,000 sets of equipment to the operational Army by the end of FY 07.

There are currently two RFI lists approved. The FY 04 list will continue to be fielded until the second quarter of FY05 and is depicted Figure 3. During the second quarter of FY 05, PEO Soldier will begin fielding the RFI list recently approved by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). We call this the Basis of Issue FY 05-07 List and this list is described in Figure 4.

Units that have already been fielded RFI will only receive that which was not originally fielded should they be called upon to redeploy. RFI does not field a system. It fields equipment based on production capability and availability. RFI is an interim solution to fielding the Soldier as a System. It is the intent of Soldier as a System to institutionalize RFI through the approval and funding of the six Soldier CDDs.

As leaders, we must set expectations for our Soldiers. Properly equipping Soldiers is a delicate balance between needs and wants. No one wants to tell an operational commander "no." However, we must acknowledge the second and third order effects caused by the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf technologies to meet a perceived need. The SaaS ICT process, shown in Figure 5, ensures we capture and validate Soldier requirements through Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) analysis. This process helps to distinguish between the need and want.

Soldier requirements are captured through the mediums identified on the left of the chart. They are then categorized into capabilities we call "ilities" found in the left cylinder. The ICT then evaluates the requirement against the "metric" in the center cylinder. Finally, the capability requirement is aligned with one of the six Soldier CDDs in the right cylinder. The end result is an integrated Soldier System.

In closing, the SaaS ICT continues to identify and validate Soldier requirements. Currently, the Core Soldier CDD is at TRADOC for staffing and approval. The Ground Soldier is at HQDA in preparation for Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approval. The Mounted Soldier ORD was approved by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) and is currently pending JROC approval. The Air Soldier ORD is JROC approved and is currently in fielding. The Maneuver Support and Sustainment CDDs are in development. The SaaS ICT anticipates forwarding these CDDs to TRADOC by first quarter FY 05.

Soldiers are the center piece of our formations and are the most deployed system in the Army. We must continue to upgrade and modernize our Soldiers as we do major weapon systems and platforms. The Soldier as a System integration concept and management process will ensure that no Soldier goes into harm's way without the proper equipment.

David J. Libersat is currently employed by SYColeman as the project officer for the Soldier as a System program with the U.S. Army Infantry School's Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Benning, Georgia. Libersat retired from active duty as a command sergeant major in September 2000. His last assignment was as the top enlisted Soldier of the U.S. Army Infantry School.

Requirements Development Strategy and Methodology




Figure 5

REFLECTIONS OF A RIFLE PLATOON LEADER

FIRST LIEUTENANT RENATO E. ANGELES

The intended purpose of this article is to reflect on my time as a platoon leader and share some things I wish I had known before becoming platoon leader and some of the things I learned while serving in the position. My intent is to convey my experience and the lessons I learned that may be of some use to others.

There is not a whole lot of literature written about being a platoon leader. Before taking over the platoon, I hoped to read some of the experiences of past platoon leaders to provide me a glimpse of some of the challenges and experiences they had, but there was not a whole lot out there to read. I thought it was important to write about my experience so as to provide some insight on the personal and professional challenges I had as a platoon leader. I wanted it to be written in a form that conveyed ideas and not a series of one-line catch phrases that were open to general interpretation.

TAKING OVER THE PLATOON

I was excited to assume duties as a platoon leader (this after all was my lifelong dream). My excitement was tempered by the realization that I was now in charge of 40 Soldiers. It's a daunting task if you put it into perspective, but that did not diminish my enthusiasm. Leading men into harm's way to defend and uphold our nation's will was a challenge I was really looking forward to.

Meeting the platoon for the first time was a thrill (looking at their faces and wondering what each man was thinking about me); it gave me the opportunity to let the men know where I came from and my initial expectations of them. I did not talk too much; it was a simple meet and greet. I never liked the idea of talking to the platoon at the onset because it was merely stating the obvious, but I have changed my view on the matter. I now believe that this is important to do because it is an opportunity to let your Soldiers know about you, your expectations, and the direction you want to take the platoon. It sets you up for a good transition.

Taking over the platoon initially has its challenges; the best way to begin is to make an assessment and get to know your Soldiers. Your commander can provide you some guidance on what is ahead and from that you can plan for your transition. It may feel overwhelming at first, especially if you get in there in the middle of training that is already in progress and you don't have time to transition. The only thing you can do is to observe and apply what you have learned. You will be surprised with what you know. The Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and Ranger School will equip you with the basics — if you paid attention. Do not feel overwhelmed, most of it is just perceived because you are new. Once you are grounded, you will get the feel for how things work.

IMPRESSING THE BOSS

I don't know if I ever truly impressed my company and battalion commanders. I might not have succeeded at each mission, but I



always tried to do my best in every task I was given and learned from my successes as well as my failures. I would be a hypocrite if I said I did not want to impress them, but I thought it was more important to learn and gain experience than worry about impressing them constantly. Earning their trust was more of my concern than trying to look good. Impressing the boss with flattery can only go so far; after a while you have to perform.

Doing your best is not enough sometimes, but it's a good start. You can't possibly know everything, and proficiency comes with time. Knowledge is learned and gained by experience. As long as you make a conscious effort to learn and get better, your mistakes will be underwritten as learning curves. I made many mistakes and in the process I learned a great deal. I am far from perfect, but I am far better than I was. Impressing the boss should probably be the least of your worries. In the end, the only people you truly have to impress are your Soldiers. You need to gain their respect, which only comes from being able to lead them.

OBSERVE AND LEARN

Any good leader or book on leadership will tell you to not make any changes until you fully understand the situation. The same thing applies when you get to a new platoon. The best thing to do initially is to observe, absorb, and analyze. Making sudden changes after beginning your tenure is not a good start. You have not been there long enough to make any judgment calls yet. Make an assessment of your platoon and its status; on average it takes months to get a grip on things.

Observe around you; watch the other platoon leaders in the company and learn from them. It is great when you establish rapport with the other PLs and pick their brains on some of the issues you have questions on. It also helps if one of them takes an active interest in getting you grounded. Sometimes you take over a platoon with really no transition time with the outgoing PL. Absorb everything — your time is very limited so try not to waste it on nonessential things. You have to hit the ground running. Learn quickly and digest information that is relevant. Don't waste time on trying to know every little



Tech Sergeant Scott Reed, USAF

A platoon leader briefs his Soldiers on an upcoming mission in Iraq.

thing. Concentrate on what is important and relevant now.

BE A LEADER

A lot is expected out of you. You might not think so but this is the case. There are some expectations you have to live up to. You have to lead from the front and establish your credibility as a leader by your actions. You must conduct yourself with class on and off duty. You don't have to be a saint, but there is an expectation of you. Like it or not, you are held to a higher standard. Establish a good working relationship with your platoon sergeant. Also, get to know your squad leaders — some of them have more years of experience than you can count on both hands. As a PL you are expected to lead — remember that. You might meet some resistance initially, but you have to exert your authority; it is your platoon. Your platoon sergeant can help you with this if he is a true professional. I was fortunate enough to have such.

The platoon takes on the personality of its leader. If you want to know which personality, just observe your Soldiers — it will become clear to you. Soldiers are looking at you for leadership; you must know and understand that.

DON'T BE AFRAID TO MAKE MISTAKES

It will happen and you are not the first

or last to make one. My experience is that honest mistakes are pardonable. The best way to learn is by making mistakes and learning from them. Don't allow mistakes to cripple you from making decisions. Remember, it is training until real bullets start flying. Training is as much for you as it is for your Soldiers. I have been called overly decisive (if there is such a thing), overly excited on the radio when making reports and just plain John Wayne at times, but that has not stopped me from learning and making hard decisions. It is better to make mistakes now and learn from them than make them later when lives are on the line. However, make no mistake about safety. Safety is always paramount; nothing you do in training is worth losing life, limb, or sight. Not knowing is not an excuse as a leader. Remember that your job encompasses all that the platoon does or fails to do. Always do your best and learn from your experiences.

LIVE A LITTLE

Don't take yourself too seriously; humor can make life more bearable. Spend some time getting to know each and every Soldier in the platoon. You will have some characters. Humor will defuse any tense situation and make light of any perceived difficulty. Just have a smile or a joke readily available to lighten the mood. Sometimes you just have to laugh about things that you

cannot control. I don't think I ever had a bad day the whole time I was a PL (maybe I did, but I just can't recall it). It was a joy being with the NCOs and Soldiers in the platoon. Many of my Soldiers are some of the finest young men our country has to offer. Their discipline and dedication to duty was truly inspirational to see day in and day out. You can't take everything seriously; try to lighten the load with some humor and fun. Do physical training (PT) and nonstandard PT with your platoon; it will strengthen your bond.

TAKE CARE OF SOLDIERS

First and foremost, this is your job — nothing could be more important than this. Always keep your Soldiers informed. Avoid propagating rumors and confront every rumor with facts. If you do not know, tell them you don't know.

Taking care of Soldiers is more than asking about them and their families. It is a conscious effort to help them improve and better themselves. There is no such thing as NCO business when it comes to taking care of Soldiers. This is your job, too. There are many different reasons why each Soldier joined the Army, but the bottom line is he volunteered to serve and defend our nation and way of life. Nothing short of absolute dedication to their care must be afforded them for what they volunteered to do (realized or not).

The best way you can take care of Soldiers is to prepare them to be ready for anything. You have to make an assessment of what your platoon is weak on and try to improve it. I found that getting feedback from the SLs works well. You have to trust your junior leaders and encourage their initiative.

KEY TO SUCCESS

Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections and rehearsals are the key to success. This is a critical leader's task to any mission tactical or otherwise. Preparation and training is the key to accomplishing anything. Rehearse every mission and let everybody know what each element is doing. Make sure they know their task and purpose and the commander's intent. Nothing will get you more ready than having everyone know what each element is doing in the overall scheme of maneuver. There is much more to this than merely stating the obvious. Establish a checklist (copy one preferably) that you go through prior to each mission and life will be much easier.

There is no secret formula to accomplishing a tactical mission. Preparation and decisive action are the only sure methods you can employ that will allow you to succeed. Know and understand your junior leaders' capabilities and weaknesses. With this in mind, you have a grasp of how to best employ and fight your platoon in a tactical setting. It is an amazing thing to see a platoon operating at peak performance. To get there requires much time and training. You have to prioritize and delegate — you can't do everything. It is a lot easier when you have great NCOs. There is no substitute for being prepared. The only sure way to succeed is to be ready.

LIST YOUR PLATOONS ACCOMPLISHMENT

I made a "List of Excellence" that I posted inside the platoon's command post (CP) of all the platoon members' accomplishments.

I am not sure if it made any impact on my Soldiers' performance, but they saw that I was keeping track of their accomplishments. This can include Soldier and NCO of the Month and Quarter competitions, Audie Murphy Club inductions, times assigned as the main effort during tactical missions, and reenlistments in the platoon. I am not sure if this makes any difference, but I like to think it does. Reward Soldiers that excel and appreciate their hard work. Nothing is more satisfying to a Soldier than being recognized for a job well done by his leaders among his peers. Always appreciate hard work with a kind word or thanks.

BE YOUR OWN MAN

In the end, you are your own best critic if you are honest with yourself. There is always something bad that can be said about you and your performance. You can almost always find a flaw in anybody if you look hard enough. Your commander cannot see and know everything you do. He bases your performance on what he knows and sees. The only thing you can be sure about is the knowledge that you have done your best and will continue to learn and grow. Never forget to be a team player. This does not mean participating on silly things or hanging out just to belong, rather contributing to better the unit whether not recognized or seen. You don't have to prove yourself to anybody but yourself. Take comfort in knowing your capabilities when they are not duly recognized. Personal satisfaction comes from knowing what you are capable of doing.

There is really not much you can do about other people's perceptions. You can only count on what you know to be true about you in your heart.

IN CONCLUSION

My time as a platoon leader was far too short, spanning only 12 months. There were things I wish I could have done differently, but that is the pain of regret. I wish I could have stayed in the position longer so I could have done and learned more. My time as a PL was definitely one of the highlights of my career thus far. It was truly a very satisfying time professionally. The bond shared under conditions of discomfort and pain, and the fond memories made on many training events will always be dear to my heart.

The Soldiers and NCOs in my platoon are some of the best our nation has to offer. I will always treasure the time I spent with them. The experience for me was both physically and mentally satisfying. The challenges were many, but the knowledge and experience I gained are significant in my growth as a leader, Soldier, and individual.

There was definitely a lot to learn and much more to learn still, but knowing the basics and applying what you learned will give you a good head start. There is probably more we can do to improve junior leaders' education before and after they leave the institution of learning, but that is a different discussion altogether.

First Lieutenant Renato E. Angeles currently serves with the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, 1st Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 25th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He was a platoon leader with 1st Platoon, A Company of the 1-24 Infantry.

PROJECT TOUCHDOWN:

HOW WE PAID THE PRICE FOR LACK OF COMSEC IN VIETNAM

DAVID FIEDLER

Editor's Note: *This article was previously published in Army Communicator magazine. The article details a glaring example of how non-secure radio communications can lead to the death of U.S. combat troops. In today's theaters of operations, the use of commercial radios without communications security (COMSEC) is still very dangerous.*

In late 1969, I and every other member of 1st Signal Brigade and 160th Signal Group's 44th Signal Battalion were searching for Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) spies within our local-hire signal workforce. (The Vietnamese locals were mostly base-camp telephone switchboard operators, installers, and repair personnel that 1st Signal Brigade employed in its base-camp facilities.) At that time, the G-2, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) – our command headquarters – was convinced that, because so much of our operational information was apparently in the enemy's hands and we were taking such high casualties, espionage on a large scale was the only possible explanation.

G-2 also felt that the most likely location for espionage was at major signal locations where operational information was concentrated and there was also a large local civilian workforce. In fact, in 44th Signal Battalion, we caught one of our cleaning women with a stolen manual for the AN/FRC-93 high frequency radio (also known commercially as the Collins KWM-2A) at a gate search. She was turned over to the Vietnamese National Police, which was probably determined to sentence the woman to death, and that bothers me even today because she was probably innocent. She probably wanted the manual for toilet paper, since such a use for publications was common among the Vietnamese.

Almost everyone was quite happy with this "spy capture" except myself and a few others. We failed to see how obtaining a manual that could be bought in any amateur radio store in America would be of much value as technical intelligence to the enemy. In addition, we thought our losses were clearly the result of operational, not technical, communications intelligence.

No spy ring, just arrogance

Thanks to our battalion S-2, 44th Signal Battalion Soldiers were aware as early as 1965 that the enemy was probably monitoring USARV tactical-radio nets. The Army Security Agency (ASA) tried to make everyone else a believer in this,


too. However, despite ASA's many warnings, it was USARV's official opinion that the NVA/VC had no equipment capable of monitoring U.S. tactical-radio nets, nor could they understand English well enough to use the information if they had the equipment. Most importantly, they believed our tactical forces moved so fast and our actions on the battlefield were so quick that even if the enemy managed to acquire some information from our tactical-radio nets, it would do them no good and us no harm. That arrogance was to cost us dearly.

At this point, it's important to know that by 1965 frequency modulation voice radio had been deployed to every level of command from squad to corps (and higher). It's also important to know that this radio equipment, AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 (handheld radios for squads or platoons), AN/PRC-25 (manpack and vehicular for platoon, company or battalion) and AN/VRC-46 (vehicular, platoon through corps and higher) did not have any communications security provisions at the Vietnam War's outset.

Since there was no COMSEC device, either internal or external, provided to this equipment until late in the conflict, the only solution was to constantly stress the vulnerability of FM voice radio intercept and analysis and to carefully use signal operating instructions, off-line (paper) operations codes and authentication tables (challenge and reply) to provide net security. As I said, however, before late 1969, the USARV and Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commanders steadfastly refused to believe there was a real communication intelligence (COMINT) threat. This attitude was reflected across the entire force at every level.

Accordingly, since existing operations codes and authentication tables were cumbersome for the typical poorly trained FM voice radio operators (most of whom were officers and senior NCOs) to use, they were rarely employed. Field commanders clearly believed that time was more important than security. This view was reinforced in the combat-arms training base, where very little time was devoted to communications subjects, even though the Signal Corps had declared combat-net radio equipment to be "user-owned and operated."

Unit signal officers (S-6/G-6) magnified the hemorrhage of vital tactical information over the radio because many of these officers were cowed by higher headquarters and tactical commanders into also believing there was no COMINT threat. By direction, signal officers rarely, if ever, took even the minimal action



of just simply changing net call signs and frequencies.

Taken together, our COMSEC laxness – created by our arrogant assessment of the enemy's capabilities and intelligence – led to a massive opportunity to intercept and exploit our tactical FM communications nets, which our astute enemy used to an extreme advantage.

While we in the Signal Corps tout good communications as a combat multiplier, we rarely mention that Vietnam proved enemy exploitation of our communications is deadly.

No one to my knowledge has ever been able to calculate the number of names on the Vietnam Wall due to poor COMSEC, but all indications are that the number is considerable. The number of Americans killed and wounded in action due to lack of radio security certainly must, in my opinion, far exceed the much-publicized losses due to friendly fire or noncombat related deaths due to accidents, for example.

The blame for this unfortunately lies squarely with the major U.S. field commands (MACV and USARV), the Signal Corps leadership, and the Signal Corps' schools at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Compounding the "user-owned and operated" COMSEC disaster was the concept that tactical-unit signal officers (S-6s) could be trained in nine weeks at Fort Gordon in the Signal Officer Basic Course. These basic signal officers were then assigned to tactical units in the United States or Europe for periods as short as eight months where, according to the Signal Corps, they would learn their job on the job, be promoted to first lieutenant and then deployed to Vietnam.

The result of this concept speaks for itself, since most signal officers when assigned to tactical units did very little signal work, had no formal training while in these assignments and no signal standards to meet while in these assignments.

Embarrassed by Alpha-3

Fortunately, in late December 1969 – almost four years after the U.S. Army deployed major units to Vietnam and after four years of exposing our combat radio nets to exploitation – the situation changed dramatically. On the morning of December 20, 1969, a scout from 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, discovered a long wire antenna on the ground at the old Michelin rubber plantation in the area northwest of Saigon. The antenna wire led to a carefully concealed underground bunker complex that was packed with enemy radio-communications intercept equipment. This complex was the operations center for an NVA/VC platoon-sized radio "technical reconnaissance unit" known as Alpha-3 that was part of the NVA's 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion.

After a short fight, 12 members of Alpha-3 were taken prisoner. Even more significant, however, was the fact that U.S. infantry also captured all of Alpha-3's equipment and its logbooks. These logbooks proved without doubt that the enemy had been intercepting U.S. voice radio traffic over an extended period of time, understood the exact meaning of the traffic and were able to easily decrypt and understand traffic covered by unauthorized

The most shocking thing about Alpha-3 platoon's capture by far, however, wasn't its intercept equipment or its ability as antenna engineers, but rather its station log books, training materials and knowledge of U.S. operational CNR doctrine and procedures.

(locally made) codes and infrequent SOI changes.

Alpha-3's actual intercept equipment wasn't the product of some super-secret Soviet or Chinese version of Fort Monmouth or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology labs. Alpha-3's stuff consisted mostly of captured AN/PRC-25 or AN/PRC-77 radios and others bought from our South Vietnam allies or through third parties.

Obviously, this equipment was 100-percent interoperable with the radios in our

units since it was identical to our equipment. Supplementing the captured or acquired U.S. standard very-high-frequency equipment, Alpha-3 had several Chinese R-139 HF receivers and a good number of Sony and Panasonic commercial radios they had simply modified to work in the U.S. tactical-frequency bands.

Alpha-3's hardware engineering wasn't without some imagination, though. At the time, all U.S. units were suffering from a critical shortage of BA-4386 magnesium batteries. Alpha-3 soldiers discovered they could solder together eight BA-30 D-cell flashlight batteries (no shortage of these) and produce the 12 volts of direct-current power the AN/PRC-25 needed to receive signals.

In addition, unlike U.S. forces, the NVA signal establishment was able to impart to Alpha-3 an appreciation of the critical role antenna engineering plays in any radio system. Compared to Fort Gordon graduates of both then and now, Alpha-3 personnel were antenna geniuses. With this knowledge, Alpha-3 was able to produce antennas that extended the normal operating distances of their radio intercept receivers far beyond their expected range.

This lesson needs to be remembered today as the Army adopts more non-COMSEC-protected radios, radio/intercoms and wireless local-area network equipment with the expectation that their low radiated-signal levels will protect them from enemy interception and exploitation. The Alpha-3 experience teaches us that nothing could be further from the truth. Supposedly ignorant third world Alpha-3 soldiers were expert enough to actually build radio receivers in the field from new and used parts obtained or manufactured locally. Very few U.S. Army Signal Corps personnel either then or now could duplicate this capability.

The most shocking thing about Alpha-3 platoon's capture by far, however, wasn't its intercept equipment or its ability as antenna engineers, but rather its station logbooks, training materials and knowledge of U.S. operational combat net radio (CNR) doctrine and procedures. In short, Alpha-3 was reading our mail and knew exactly what it meant and what to do about it. U.S. infantrymen found handwritten logs containing the texts of American voice conversations transcribed verbatim in English and then analyzed by excellent English linguists.

The 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion was primarily interested in plain-language and brevity-coded voice communications its intercept operators had no problem understanding. Of particular interest were forward air controller, forward observer, command and control, and civilian press communications. The civilian press, in fact, proved to be a great

source of immediate operational information throughout the war. Present day commanders should take a lesson from this when considering allowing the civilian press and its normally uncovered communications (satellite phone, cell phone, etc.) into their operations area. A better approach may be to let the press use COMSEC-protected military communications to avoid immediate disclosure of critical operational information.

The Alpha-3 logs showed us that back in 1965 we were passing this operations-security information over the air in the clear because we underestimated the enemy's COMINT capabilities:

- Artillery target information (in time for the enemy to take cover);
- Artillery harassment and interdiction fire schedules (in time for the enemy to stay clear of targeted locations);
- Ambush site locations (bringing up the question of who ambushed who);
- Casualty reports;
- Air strike (B-52) warnings;
- Friendly troop positions;
- Radio-net call sign and frequency changes;
- Unit status reports;
- Plans and orders; and
- Idle operator chitchat containing all sorts of operational information.

More examination of captured enemy material also revealed the enemy had deduced from their COMINT operations the following general characteristics about our CNR operations and could exploit them:

■ U.S. units made extensive use of locally produced unauthorized codes, many of the "point of origin" or Sardot type, which the NVA/VC had no difficulty cracking. Alpha-3's logs clearly show many locally invented coded transmissions transcribed verbatim and then the plain English meaning of the transmission written next to it. The seriousness of this action was magnified many times because U.S. operators were convinced their transmissions sounded great over the radio, were fully secure, and could only be understood by friendly forces. The amount of tactical advantage given to the enemy because of this false sense of security can only be imagined.

■ Captured 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion training material stated that U.S. units didn't change call

signs or frequencies very often, but when they did, some frequencies or other components were often retained from the previous net structure. The material went on to explain how to recover unit identity after an SOI change. An example was shown of operator chitchat where one operator told another the details of an SOI change (old call sign to new call sign, old frequency to new frequency) many hours before the actual change. In this case, 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion made the change faster than the U.S. unit, who had coordination problems. The 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion's interceptors had already been waiting for several hours on the new frequencies by the time the U.S. unit got its problems sorted out.

■ U.S. units often failed to use authentication procedures in a deception environment. This was particularly evident under a higher stress situation such as medical evacuation, search-and-rescue, quick-fire artillery targets and units in contact with the enemy. The NVA's imitative communications deception could exploit this U.S. characteristic to lure evacuation and SAR aircraft into preplanned "kill boxes," misdirect artillery fire to harmless locations or on to U.S. forces and disrupt, confuse and expose maneuvering U.S. troops. I personally saw this at work in 1969, when an unauthenticated transmission caused 69th Signal Battalion's base camp at Ben Hua to be shelled, producing produced several casualties.

■ U.S. radio operators, many of whom were field grade commissioned officers and senior NCOs, lacked proper circuit discipline. These operators were prone to long chats over the air that invariably led to the disclosure of important operational information.

■ Prior to major operations, COMSEC levels didn't increase. This led to disclosure of some useful information before almost every U.S. operation.

■ Secure communications equipment, if available, was almost never used between 1965 and 1969, since the equipment (Nestor) was bulky and the S-6 staff had problems structuring mixed COMSEC and non-COMSEC radio nets. This changed after the capture of Alpha-3, when a crash program began immediately to install COMSEC equipment in vehicles and aircraft.

Equipment bulk was not a problem on these platforms but was for manpack operations, so equipping the light infantry lagged. Unfortunately, the bulk of U.S. combat forces were light infantry.

■ Radio operators in tactical units generally failed to acknowledge radio communications' vulnerability to COMINT. After Alpha-3's capture, great pressure was brought upon the Signal Corps to improve operator training. This was done in many maneuver units, but since most equipment was "user-owned and operated," operator training was considered out of Signal's control and thus improvements were difficult, spotty and depended on the unit's S-6 and staff's quality and training. Mindsets were also very hard to change in maneuver units, where signal officers weren't particularly well regarded as communications experts, sometimes with good reason.

If these revelations weren't shocking enough, the Alpha-3 treasure trove of training documents also showed how extracted information from radio transmissions was used against specific units such as 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry Division.

The 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion actually profiled these major U.S. units based on CNR intercepts. Some typical examples of unit profiling were:

- Normal modes of transportation, down to identifying vehicle types and characteristics. The VC/NVA, according to Alpha-3, had a healthy respect for the M-113 family of armored personnel carriers and the UH-1 helicopter. The M-151 jeep didn't particularly impress them, neither did the Stryker-like V-100 armored car U.S. military policemen used.

- Unit areas of operation. The enemy usually knew which U.S. unit was opposing them and within what areas the unit operated.

- Methods of navigation. The enemy knew which units were using landmarks to determine position and what the landmarks were.

- Unit message formats and radio procedures.

- Unit composition, weapons and capabilities.

- Radio-net traffic volume and what it meant.

Also, 47th Technical Reconnaissance

Battalion was sophisticated enough to actually analyze the tone and content of unit radio traffic and used the analysis to predict unit actions. There is considerable information that 47th knew much of this type of data before the Tet 1968 enemy offensive and used it against us extensively during that action.

After Alpha-3 was captured in 1969, a new emphasis was placed on COMSEC in U.S. combat units.

Long-dormant signal staff officers began to enforce long-disregarded COMSEC directives, such as station authentication and encryption of coordinates, due to pressure from their combat-arms commanders.

Project Touchdown

The information that Alpha-3's logs contained astounded the USARV commander, General Creighton Abrams. A surviving audio record of Abrams' reaction to this (I've personally listened to it) reveals an obviously shaken commander completely floored by proof that our enemy had been intercepting and exploiting our tactical voice radio communications on a grand scale and that there was no spy organization to be busted.

After this, Abrams' hostility to Signal Corps officers, our training, doctrine and tactics as taught and conceived at Fort Gordon – and particularly Signal officers in S-6/G-6 assignments battalion through corps – is legendary. Led by the MACV high command, the Signal Corps quickly became the target for an unmerciful attack by our combat arms brethren, who at the time needed a blood sacrifice and something to blame for why the ground war was not going particularly well.

Unfortunately, much of the attack was well deserved. The Army got so serious about placing the blame mostly on the Signal Corps that the National Security Agency – the folks responsible for producing codes, ciphers and COMSEC equipment, not the Signal Corps (whom Army headquarters assumed would lack objectivity) – was directed to produce detailed briefings, training materials and movies exposing how Army combat communications were being exploited in Vietnam. In their effort to expunge themselves from blame, top commanders declassified this information and used it to justify procuring new, less vulnerable CNR equipment (Nestor, Vinson, the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) as well as establishing larger field COMSEC organizations controlled by G-2, not the Signal Corps. The name for this exposure effort was Project Touchdown, and the Army distributed its highly embarrassing training materials under that name for many years.

Relevance for today

Many today will ask what relevance this almost 40-year-old information is to today's Army? I say:

- Never underestimate the capabilities of your "electronic enemy." Technology needs to be applied with a good dose of common military sense today more than ever. Even a technologically unsophisticated enemy like 47th Technical Reconnaissance Battalion can find a flaw in something we do and exploit it. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems are often the most vulnerable to exploitation – the Signal Corps is the heart of C4ISR, so be alert.

- The trained S-6 is key to protecting combat units from

COMINT and other forms of communications and automation exploitation. Assignment of junior, inexperienced, minimally trained officers to S-6 positions in maneuver units leads directly to defeat on the battlefield, as the Vietnam experience proved.

- COMSEC and OPSEC procedures properly applied in Vietnam would have kept many names off that famous wall in Washington. In the most glaring cases of Tet 1968 and 7th Cavalry/1st Cavalry Division at Ia Drang 1969, we'll never know how many lives could have been saved by a few well-trained signal officers aggressively doing their jobs in spite of what others may have thought. In my opinion, the number would have been considerable.

Over the years since Vietnam, the temptation to relax COMSEC and OPSEC requirements for the sake of convenience, ease of operation, cost, time, or just plain laziness continues to rear its ugly head.

While all CNRs in tactical units now have either embedded or external COMSEC devices, the temptation not to use them or not to change the COMSEC keys, for instance, has triumphed too often. The devices and proper net-operations procedures do no good if you don't use them.

Also, to satisfy their commander's perceived need for more communications, some S-6s have sanctioned the use of unprotected radio equipment to supplement organic protected CNRs.

Initially, modified amateur (ham) radios were used, followed by citizen-band radios (particularly during the CB craze of the 1970s) and, most recently, by Family Radio Service radios – which can be easily obtained, don't even require a Federal Communications Commission license and have been seen in some units, even outside the continental United States. Sometimes this equipment is disguised with names like wireless LAN, soldier intercom, brand-name brick, wireless orderwire, cellular telephone and cellular telephone walkie-talkie – and now even voice-over-Internet protocol and others.

Users invariably treat these devices as if they were secure U.S. Type I COMSEC protected CNRs. If you don't believe me, the next time you're in an operational situation, see if anyone on a cell phone is authenticating the station on the other end, using operations codes or encrypting location coordinates.

If we learned nothing else from Vietnam and Alpha-3, it's that this sort of thing gets people killed and must be stopped. Only the competent, well-trained and aggressive S-6/G-6 is able to do this, so let's get on with it!

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Fiedler has served in Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard signal, infantry, and armor units and as a DA civilian engineer since 1971. He holds degrees in both physics and engineering and a master's degree in industrial management. He is the author of many articles in the fields of combat communications and electronic warfare.

So, You'RE GOING TO IRAQ?

Company Commander Shares Successful Tactics, Techniques

CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER L. BUDIHAS

In the Army training model, you “train as you fight,” however, what ends up happening when you get into combat is that you will inversely “fight as you had trained.” Now that sounds like common sense to most, but as Soldiers have found out during their tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, the effects of finger-drilled training rises to the top. Leaders must take every opportunity, while at home station and once deployed, to train their units and refine their SOPs. Training does not stop once you are deployed — complacency must be fought. In this article, I do not intend to tell you how a rifle company and its commander should operate in combat, but to present some of what we did which made us successful in our little piece of Iraq.

Background

The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) was scheduled to go to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in January 2004. However, in July 2003 we were notified that the Warrior Brigade

would deploy as part of Operation Enduring Freedom V. Because of our battalion's intense preparation for JRTC, it was easy for the company to transition tactically for the deployment to Afghanistan. We had conducted a number of field exercises which included company and platoon search and attack lanes, combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs), and air assault operations. We had prepared for the fight in Afghanistan. Then in late October, we were notified that the unit would deploy to Iraq to replace the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Kirkuk region in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

To give you an appreciation of our operations in Iraq, this article will attack many of the areas surrounding our company operations by subject. I'll take you from landing in Kuwait to company combat operations in theater to sustainment training.

RSOI in Kuwait

When we landed in Kuwait, we immediately closed on Camp Virginia to stage the brigade for the follow-on movement into Iraq. Being a light infantry company, we never had more than two HMMWVs to support us during any pre-deployment training. The company immediately took advantage of our time. Once we receive our allotment of vehicles (10 x M-998 cargo HMMWV), leaders developed and tested SOPs for convoy movements and mounted combat patrols. The Udarai Range in Kuwait allowed us the opportunity to test those SOPs under live-fire conditions, during both day and night. Our time in Kuwait was a great opportunity to rehearse, reconfirm weapons zero, conduct PT, and mentally prepare the Soldiers for the push into Iraq. Other units took this time to rest prior to the movement north. This final period prior to combat is too important for



Staff Sergeant Daniel Davenport

rest. Use all available time to get those final touches done prior to moving north.

The Five Pillars to Successful Operations

Our company was very proficient at executing troop leading procedures prior to deploying. We realized how fluid the environment we were operating in was with the various dynamics brought on by the enemy, civilian population, religion, customs, politics, and former regime ways. In this environment, it was apparent to us that we needed to further reduce the troop leading procedures sequence because of the time compressed operations we were required to execute to retain the initiative over the enemy and stay in his decision-making cycle. For instance, we would have informants come to the forward operating base (FOB) to report on an individual(s) resulting in the need to assemble a force, brief a plan, and execute it, in most cases in less than three hours. If we didn't, the target would be gone by the time we arrived. Solid SOPs, rehearsals, and experience would give us the agility to turn intelligence into action within a small amount of time. To ensure "we answered all the mail" prior to executing an operation in a reduced timeline, I developed what I called the "5 Pillars." These pillars would facilitate any force's ability to achieve its end state in relation to the enemy, terrain, and friendly force. Plus, it would allow subordinates to operate within the intent of their leaders. The 5 Pillars were:

Concept of the Operations – What are we going after? What is going to happen? How is it going to happen? Where is everyone at? What will the end look like?

Fire Plan – What are artillery and mortars doing? What type of support is aviation providing? Who and how are they being controlled?

Tactical and Fire Control Measures – What routes, checkpoints, release points, phase lines, etc., are going to keep us within the plan? What fire control measures are going to allow us to maximize our fire power on the enemy and not ourselves?

Medevac Plan – Where are the medics and CLS aidmen? Where are the CLS bags and litters? Where do casualties go? How do they get evacuated by air and ground?

Signal Plan – What type of radios and nets are we going to communicate on? What

We've found that 80 percent of the company's time will be spent in some manner patrolling, both mounted and dismounted. So, it is extremely important for the unit, prior to deployment, to develop and exercise some solid patrolling SOPs.

are the primary and alternate signals to commence, shift, and cease fire?

As we found, if you can address the "5 Pillars" prior to the execution of any mission, regardless of the amount of time available, you can beat the enemy force and preserve your force.

The Big 5 You Must Know

When operating in Iraq, there are a couple of operations you need to train your company on prior to deployment. These operations are raid, cordon and search, patrolling (mounted and dismounted), traffic control points, and route clearance. Raids are fairly self explanatory. Actionable intelligence on an individual(s) and/or equipment at a certain location drives you to execute this operation. Cordon and searches are done in most cases where there is "reasonable" information collected that a targeted individual(s) and/or equipment are present in a certain place. In many cases, cordon and searches end up being "knock" and searches. This is where the terrain and population is under control and nonthreatening to our force, so we can simply knock rather than breach the house in a dynamic manner.

We've found that 80 percent of the company's time will be spent in some manner patrolling, both mounted and dismounted. So, it is extremely important for the unit, prior to deployment, to develop and exercise some solid patrolling SOPs. When patrolling, the Soldiers must remember the fundamentals of patrolling and always know their actions on contact. I must reiterate that leaders must enforce and supervise security when patrolling — never let your guard down! Also, all units will operate in some type of urban environment

most of the time they are in theater, so they will need to remember that it's a three-dimensional fight and to always search and scan the battlefield in depth.

Traffic control points (TCPs) are a task that the force will find itself doing periodically. TCPs give us the ability to get a feel for what contraband may be moving in or through our battle space. We frequently used "snap" TCPs to interdict enemy movement within the AO. "Snap" TCPs are improvised TCPs, set up for a short duration, to keep terrorist and criminal elements off balance and to seize contraband moving along the roads in our sector. On average, we would only operate these TCPs from a specific location for no longer than an hour. Once a TCP was established, the word gets out among the population quickly and they become ineffective after three hours.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become to Soldiers in Iraq, what booby traps were to Soldiers in Vietnam. The terrorists adapted this TTP for a number of reasons. First, the Iraqi insurgent or foreign terrorist is generally a coward, who does not want to fight our Soldiers in a direct contact fight. Second, it is easy for the enemy to plant these devices and blow them up from a distance in order to evade capture. Third, there is ordnance all over the country from the fall of the former regime, and IEDs are relatively easy to construct. With a simple radio or electronic controlled device (garage door openers, car alarms, cell phones, etc...) as an initiator, a blasting cap and/or fuse and an explosive (artillery or mortar shells, rockets, aircraft bombs, plastic explosives, etc...), you have an IED. Lastly, our Army is bound by the highways and roads that move our supplies, personnel, and equipment. So, we are often predictable targets on the main supply routes (MSR) and alternate supply routes (ASR).

The key of preventing or reducing these IEDs from being employed in your area of operations (AO) is through route clearance. What do I mean by route clearance? Generally, it would look something like this: simply driving at a slow rate of speed (10 to 20 mph) scanning for suspicious items along the route, then dismounting to clear those suspicious items or areas. It would also involve dismounting to clear all bridges (to include

under), overpasses, signs, culverts, and guard rails. It is important that when you dismount, the force clears the area where an ambusher could hide prior to clearing the suspicious item, bridge, overpass, or sign. Always clear far to near. Keep Soldiers in overwatch to cover the element that is clearing. If the clearing element is engaged, they can quickly react, usually killing or preventing the escape of the attacker. Additionally, a 152mm artillery shell has an effective casualty radius of up to 50 meters, so it's important for your vehicles to stay at least 150 meters or further from the area you are attempting to clear. The company did route clearance on all major MSRs and ASRs in our sector a minimum of once a day. We had the Iraqi National Guard (ING)

execute route clearance operations at sunrise, mid-morning, two hours prior of sunset, and in the evening to supplement the overall coverage of the main roads to prevent IED attacks on Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The unit we relieved would only execute route clearance two or three times a week. On average, they would find or be attacked by IEDs two or more times a week. Because of the frequency and the thoroughness at which we cleared the roads, we were attacked zero times in five months and found less than 10 IEDs in our sector. The police, ING, and locals attributed the lack of attacks due to the fact that we (U.S. and ISF) cleared the roads so often that terrorists would not want to risk being caught. Terrorists could simply go in another unit's area to plant an IED with no risk of being captured. If you come to Iraq, do deliberate route clearance; it'll save your Soldiers' lives.

Urban Patrolling, Our Way

The company's model for urban patrolling was based on lessons learned by British forces in Northern Ireland. Some of these tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned included engaging the population through nonlethal tactics. We recognized that this is a counterinsurgent war, and the way to win is to influence the population in order to prevent the support of "anti-Iraqi forces" (AIF). All Iraqis had been immersed in anti-American rhetoric/propaganda thru Saddam's state-run television and radio for more than 30 years. So, the best way to break down that barrier was to show the people that we weren't those wicked people that Saddam and other anti-American organizations claimed we were. Quickly, 75 percent of the population realized that even though we were different, we were still the same in many respects and held many of the same basic human values. Because of this, the Iraqi population and the American Soldiers found a mutual respect for one another. It's important for your Soldiers to have a healthy respect (don't have to love them) for the population, their religion,



Staff Sergeant Daniel Davenport

In order to know the population and gain their trust, you have to get out on the streets and patrol. Leaders need to talk to the population. The more you are out there, the more information you will pick up.

culture, and customs if you are going to be successful in Iraq. If you become arrogant, pompous, and disrespectful to the locals, you will only empower the insurgents.

What I would like to offer you is our company's perspective and a couple of TTPs for conducting urban patrolling operations.

1) "Boots on the Ground" — In order to know the population and to gain their trust, you have to get out on the streets and patrol. The leaders need to talk to the population. The more you are out there, the more information you will pick up and the more the people may trust or at least tolerate you. Obviously not everyone will embrace you, but the majority of the population sees a future built upon the freedom the Coalition has given them and the security we provide their society during this important time in their history.

2) "Waves, Smiles, and Handshakes" — Waves and smiles break down a lot of barriers. It shows a sense of friendship and breaks tension. Smiling will show you as nonthreatening, and shaking hands demonstrates that you have a general respect for them. On patrols, both mounted and dismounted, the company had a "waving campaign." This is where we would wave to everyone, regardless if they liked us or not. It was also a good test to see who was friendly or not. In a couple of towns in our area of operations, we had Arab and Turkomen mothers slapping and scolding their children for waving at the Coalition Soldiers. However, those incidents would not deter us from executing this campaign. Over a couple of months, in a number of villages which were initially either anti-Coalition or indifferent, they became friendlier to the company.

3) "Hard Targeting" — The one thing about patrols operating in an area over time is that your routes and speed can become somewhat routine. We adopted a technique called "hard targeting." What this simply entailed was the patrol, at any given time, would pick up a double time for a short duration and, at times, change the direction of the patrol's movement to prevent being targeted, trailed, or predictable.

4) "Carman, Spotter, Recorder, and Cameraman" — These

are simply tasks assigned to patrol members to enhance the effectiveness of the combat patrol.

Carman: Responsible for identifying vehicles reported by the S-2 as anti-Coalition (i.e., possible VBIED, known terrorist vehicle, used in a crime, etc...). He would have the vehicle "black list" and check it throughout the patrol. Additionally, he would look for vehicles that may have some type of suspicious battle damage (bullet holes) or foreign license plates.

Spotter: Responsible for identifying suspected or known anti-Coalition personnel or criminals. He would have the personnel "black and gray list" from the battalion S-2 section. When talking with the police, government officials, and Iraqi National Guard (ING) and they mention names, you could easily reference these lists.

Recorder: Responsible for recording everything that occurs during the patrol, to include times, events, and personnel engaged (talked to) during the patrol. His notes became crucial during debriefs and filling out patrol reports. These reports could also be referenced later in building targeting packets.

Cameraman: Responsible for taking digital pictures during the patrol. He would take pictures of suspicious personnel and activities. Additionally, he would take pictures of personnel who were engaged by the patrol leader. This was an excellent tool where you could superimpose the pictures on patrol reports and target folders. Lastly, during raids, he would take pictures of captured personnel with confiscated equipment and contraband.

Endless Meetings

As a company commander, I spent most of my time engaging key Iraqi personnel through meetings in my area of operations. These people ranged from chiefs of police and city counsels to medical professionals and Iraqi National Guard commanders. My ultimate goal as a company commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom II was to get the local leadership in the government and security forces operating on their own with Coalition oversight. Basically, I wanted to coach, teach, and mentor them to the point that they were effectively operating on their own.

In February 2004, the unit I relieved had basically run the government and gave all orders to the security forces. At that time, the appointed local government had no grasp of public service, building a better community, or how to work well with their fellow council members. Prior to liberation, the Iraqi people generally existed to serve the government and Baath Party, with the politicians attempting to gain as much power and wealth as they could. The challenge for us was that we had to get them over this sickness and teach them the general principles of a democracy. I invested a lot of my time teaching Government 101, Economics 101, Political Science 101, and many other classes on what I thought was fundamental to get their local governments operating. However, it was difficult for them to practice these principles until they broke away from their old bad habits. After months of coaching, we saw progress in the city governments and on the streets. To date, this is still a work in progress and will be for many years to come.

Overall, I would spend about a third of my time working with the local governments and municipalities, a third working with the police and new Iraqi National Guard, and the other third out patrolling and meeting the local people. Meeting people is very important. It gives you a true appreciation and "gut" feeling for the atmosphere of the towns and villages. You personally get an understanding of what projects they need,

the security in the area, and who is doing what. The majority of my actionable intelligence was collected from the Soldiers or me talking to the population and its local leaders. Units have to get out of the FOB daily and hit the streets in order to have any effect in their area of operations.

Exit Strategy = Iraqi Security Forces

The week that our company assumed our area of operations, we inherited two newly formed and graduated Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) companies, the precursor to Iraqi National Guard (ING). Early in the operation, it was readily apparent that the strategy for the United States to get out of Iraq was to get the Iraqi security forces trained and in charge of their own country. Right off the bat, I aligned a rifle platoon to each ING company in a partnership for training and operating together. Daily, the platoons embedded a rifle squad in the ING companies. The initial five weeks of training was devoted to team and squad tactics. Even though we were extremely busy in the AO, having Coalition Soldiers embedded with these newly formed organizations paid huge dividends later when the ING was operating independently and jointly with us. The intangible result of having a U.S. Army squad daily working with the ISF was remarkable! Through their sheer daily example, the squads demonstrated to the Iraqis not only how to operate tactically, but how to act as Soldiers, receive orders, and execute missions. It



Staff Sergeant Daniel Davenport

Progress through cooperation — The company commander attends a weekly Daquq city counsel meeting. About a third of his time is spent working with the local governments and municipalities.

showed the Iraqi officers and NCOs how to lead by example, make decisions, and issue instructions. The platoon leaders and platoon sergeants worked with the platoon and Iraqi company leadership on how to plan and operate in both tactical and garrison environments.

By late March, we had ING platoons and companies conducting raids and cordon and searches jointly with us. They not only gave the company more combat power, but their knowledge of the area and population allowed us to be successful. I attribute our success with these ING companies to a couple factors:

- 1) Embedding U.S. forces gave us a legitimate bond as mutual partners in this counterinsurgency to fight against terrorists, and
- 2) We selected and promoted Soldiers and officers based on merit and not who they were or who they knew.

When operating in Iraq, it is very important to conduct joint security patrols with police and ING forces. I say “security” patrols rather than “presence” for a specific reason. The term “presence” patrol was born out of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Iraq, however, we were doing much more than being seen. Through these patrols, we were providing security to the town or village by looking for terrorist activity, denying the enemy a safe haven, keeping him off balance by operating in his battle space, and collecting information from the population. Additionally, the use of joint patrols with the local security forces achieved a number of other effects. First, it trained them on how to properly patrol and treat the population. During the former regime, having a weapon and a badge gave you the right to mistreat the populace. Second, it got them out of their headquarters and out in the public doing their jobs. The police had a bad habit of sitting around their police stations “hanging out” waiting for something to happen, rather than out “walking a beat” preventing crime or incidents from occurring. Third, it gave them legitimacy. Because of the poor history of the police during Saddam’s period, the people would see the police as an enemy and not as a protector. So, by being seen with Coalition forces, it would give the police legitimacy.

Training Never Stops!

It is evitable, but if you do not train in combat your skills will diminish. If you allow your Soldiers to develop a “we are in combat” or “I’m a veteran” attitude, it’ll directly affect the readiness of the unit. It is true that during one year of operations you can get really proficient in some tasks, but in a year they are not going to execute many tasks associated with their MOS until they get back to home station. For this reason, it’s important that officers provide training guidance and NCOs drive training. Never except finger-drilled, half-step training from your leaders. They must plan, resource, rehearse, and execute training to standard. Here are some of the ways we conducted training:

Physical Fitness: Operations in the company were generally run at the platoon and squad levels. With a high operational tempo and living in a very small FOB (255 feet by 466 feet), it was a challenge to keep Soldiers fit. This was a squad leader’s fight, which needed monitoring by the platoon leaders and sergeants. The company’s goal was that Soldiers would run at a minimum of four times a week and/or a total of 100 minutes. Also, squad leaders established routines with weight training and calisthenics. Additionally, to break up the patrolling routine, achieve a good

workout, and keep the locals wondering about us, platoons conducted foot marches within the town. We would get up at 0600 and look at 0700 when we were roadmarching through the D. city market with 70 pound rucksacks on our backs. Another method to monitor Soldiers’ fitness was to conduct monthly platoon inventory APFTs and execute supervised height and weight tests.

Marksmanship: An infantryman who cannot hit what he is aiming at is useless. Since we were living in a small FOB in a town, marksmanship was a challenge. However, our battalion had two multiple-purpose ranges to our south that we often used. The goal was to reconfirm zero on all weapons, do a sequence of close quarter marksmanship drills and long-range shooting (300 meter +) a minimum of once a month. We obviously wanted to shoot more, but our operational commitments limited our time. This at least gave the Soldiers the confidence needed that their weapons were zeroed and they could hit what they were aiming at. Fortunately, when our battalion went on missions outside our sector in both Mosul and Najaf, we had the opportunity to do platoon convoy live-fire ranges to revalidate our SOPs and maintain our lethality.

Medical Training: The company goal was to bimonthly train on six separate medical tasks. Having the battalion’s Advance Trauma Life Support (ATLS) Team, consisting of the battalion physician assistant and two senior medical NCOs, attached greatly enhanced the company’s advanced medical training beyond what the Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Course taught. We had a surplus of basic Class VIII supplies at the FOB, so we could incorporate medical aid training during FOB Quick Reaction Force (QRF) drills. These drills gave the squad CLS Soldiers and medics a great opportunity to train.

Officer and Leader Development Program (OPD and LPD): Once a week, the leaders (if not on mission) would assemble to do formal and informal classes in order to hone our war-fighting ability and professional development. On several occasions, we would do a tactical decision-making game (TDG) based on a situation built on the terrain (towns and villages) we operated in daily. These TDGs gave us the opportunity to discuss a variety of issues, from troop leading procedures and the effects of terrain to actions on the objective and information operations. The importance of doing these exercises was not so much the mechanics of the solution, but getting to the decision that was made and the “why.” This helped us bond as a leadership team, so in future combat operations we knew how the man on our left and right was thinking. Also, the company first sergeant on many occasions taught classes to professionally develop the officers and NCOs in subjects such as: OERs and NCOERs, counseling, force protection measures, and promotion board procedures.

The Other Important Stuff

Sometimes inexperienced company commanders can forget about the importance of their mortar sections during this counterinsurgent fight. On all raids and cordon and searches, I took a minimum of one 60mm tube with 24 rounds of high explosive, 12 rounds of illumination, and six white phosphorus rounds. When needed, they suppressed enemy personnel in the objective area, suppressed personnel attempting to escape, illuminated the battlefield, and marked targets for rotary-wing

air support. Due to the FOB being located on the edge of a town, I would periodically (on average four times a week) use mortar illumination rounds as pseudo H&I fires. My intent was to not cause any unnecessary local national casualties, but I wanted them to know that we were still there and alert. Additionally, these fire missions were executed in conjunction with QRF drills. The mortar section would be graded and timed in accordance with ARTEP standards. The company mortar section is an invaluable asset, and they proved themselves during a five-hour battle against the Sadr Militia in Najaf.

Commanders these days usually have a personal security detachment (PSD). My PSD was made up of my Javelin section, periodically augmented by my mortar section. I stood up the company's Javelin section 14 months earlier to serve as both the company's anti-armor element and scouts. The Soldiers were hand-selected for this section and were very well-trained by their former scout section leader. A couple of good reasons for using this section to serve as the commander's PSD included:

- 1) I was not taking combat power away from the rifle platoons;
- 2) The section's maintenance and rest cycle corresponded with mine;
- 3) They had a habitual understanding of the commander's weekly battle rhythm.

The PSD was responsible for ensuring the commander's security; whether it was a mounted or dismounted patrol, a meeting at a government institution, a meeting with religious leaders, or doing village assessments.

The company ran a three squad guard rotation for a three-day cycle. What this cycle would do to the rifle platoons is leave the platoon leadership with two squads to operate with at any given time. Prior to assuming guard, the oncoming squads would assemble in the company ready room (small theater in the FOB) to receive "The First Sergeant's Guard Mount Brief." This brief was extremely important because it got the Soldiers refocused on their responsibility of guarding the company. The guard mount would cover the current enemy threat, rules of engagement and company guard SOPs, that included: actions during various types of scenarios, QRF standards, and emergency procedures.

As part of that guard rotation, the squad coming off would assume the company



Staff Sergeant Daniel Davenport

The company mortar section is an invaluable asset. During a five-hour battle with Sadr militia in Najaf, the company mortar section played a critical role in the engagement.

QRF. The QRF was augmented with a medic and the ATLS Team (with an ambulance) prepared to join them in less than five minutes after notification. The company had a QRF staging area where the squads would stage all their personal and special equipment. The QRF squad leader had to monitor company operations by often dropping by the company tactical operations center (TOC) to see what was occurring in the company's battle space to increase his situational awareness. Twice daily (day and night), the first sergeant, executive officer, or I would conduct a QRF drill. These drills would incorporate likely tactical scenarios, such as to reinforce a police traffic control point, friendly unit in contact, high value target (HVT) sighting, friendly vehicle accident, and mass casualty situation. The drills allowed us to work on decision-making, battle tracking, casualty evacuation, indirect fire support, working with the police and ING.

The "exploitation team" in a raid is critical to the ultimate success of the operation. Their job is to preserve captured equipment and documents seized during and after actions on the objective. An exploitation team was used to maximize the amount of "correct evidence" to take into custody. This team would consist of a fire team that would have two digital cameras, a large heavy duty 50-gallon waterproof kit bag filled with large zip lock bags, labels,

and black markers. It is critical to properly preserve and record evidence. This detainee will eventually go to a criminal hearing where they will be tried in an Iraqi civilian court of law. Evidence preservation could be the difference between a terrorist going to jail for years or getting released. When taking pictures of captured equipment, it's important to have the terrorist in the picture with it. It sounds ridiculous, but it will unquestionably show that the terrorist was present during the capture and the tools of his trade.

The areas I focused on in this article were tested, refined, or discovered in the combat operations and sacrifices made by the brave men of Alpha Company. The six months I commanded this company in Iraq were the most memorable of my military career. I saw the best and worst of warfare in this period, from establishing a well in a village for 73 families to fighting Sadr Militia in Najaf.

Captain Christopher Budihas is currently serving as the brigade assistant S-3 for the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. He served as company commander of A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry from June 2002 to June 2004.

CPT Budihas received his commission thru the Marine Corps' commissioning program as a distinguished graduate in 1994. He has seven years of infantry enlisted service and nine years of commissioned infantry service with experience in six combat operations/campaigns during his career.

SHOULDER PATCHES:

IDENTIFICATION FOR THE FUTURE BRIGADES

ROBERT L. GOSCIEWSKI

After World War II, the 92nd Infantry Division saw its colors retired and its members move on to other units. Despite its heroic accomplishments in the Po Valley, the 92nd ID joined many other honorable units in the annals of military history. Now, the colors of the 92nd may fly once more, as the Army of this new century takes the field.

Most Soldiers are well aware of the many transformation initiatives. Begun under Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki and continued by CSA General Peter Schoomaker, the “leap ahead” in our tools of warfare is being realized. The Land Warrior program is bringing 21st century technology to the Soldier’s fingertips. The Future Combat System will revolutionize our equipment and ground transportation in all dimensions and across all five senses. The Warfighter Information Network - Terrestrial will connect every Soldier to enable instant communications and information availability. Move. Shoot. Communicate. That’s what it’s all about.

Still, these three programs are simply the flagship initiatives of Army Transformation. There are many other projects, each in varying stages from experiments to development, to procurement and fielding. Combined, they will all work together to produce the Future Force.

We know that is easier said than done. After a Soldier’s been around for awhile, he will know, or know someone who knows, the joy of being in a unit that received a new piece of equipment, or undergoes a “modernization” of one of the units systems, or simply decides to try out a new idea. There’s always some degree of pain in making it fit. So it’s easy to imagine the training, education, and reorganization



that will be required when we begin to see all of these initiatives arriving in our units.

The process of tracking the many impacts a new program will have on an Army unit has been around for awhile. In fact every new program has to document and plan for the impacts before the system can be approved for fielding. This is to ensure the new program will be compatible with everything it will find out in the “real Army.” This impact process is known by the acronym DTLOMPFE, after the seven domains of impacts to be measured — Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Materiel, People, and Facilities. Like an integrated system, any change in one of these domains impacts on one or more of the others.

We are seeing this now. Over the last few years we introduced new technologies to make the 4th Infantry Division the

Army’s digitized division. We took the good ideas that have proven valuable and put them into the mix for Operation Iraqi Freedom. One example is the information exchange capability of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). We used the new capabilities and the resulting new tactics to empower our leadership and our people for speed and flexibility.

DISCRETE MODULES FOR THE FUTURE

Now we are beginning to reorganize our units to leverage the new doctrine and personnel capabilities as well as the new materiel. At the direction of CSA Schoomaker, the 3rd ID is reforming its three brigades into five brigades. They will no longer have a division support command (DISCOM). This reorganization is the first attempt at creating what the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) calls the Future Force’s Unit of Action (UA). As the Stryker brigades are the interim solution of the Army’s transformation, the UA is being organized in a modular fashion whose focus is the core competency of the land force.

The future Army will be modular, and the UA is the Army’s brigade-size “building block” for task organizing a force to meet any mission. This model for organization of the future force can be considered a modular approach to force structure based on the capabilities requirements necessary to meet a given operation. This approach provides the much needed flexibility for the future Army. Flexibility is particularly necessary to meet the many non-core, often small-scale, or humanitarian contingencies and nation building operations that it is increasingly called upon to perform. Each UA will be autonomous. Able to operate

independently on the battlefield, it will still work as part of a team with the other UA units under a Unit of Employment (UE).

Both the UE and the UA can be configured and scaled based on the capabilities needed. A UE is analogous to Joint Task Force headquarters and a Land Force headquarters, depending on the configuration. The smaller, army-centric UE is currently called a UEx, and the larger, multi-service, theater-wide UE is currently designated a UEy. Either of these headquarters units may work for a joint task force or may be organized to work directly for a unified combatant commander.

In the same way, a UA design is not restricted to a direct combat unit. There will be UA designs for Engineer capabilities, communications or security support capabilities, and for sustainment.

The brigade-sized Units of Action and the Land Force Headquarters Units of Employment are being designed to execute the Army's core competencies. Through these two basic building blocks, the Army will construct a versatile force structure to guarantee the American people it will succeed in the two essential services: protection of the United States and its interests, and the waging of land warfare.

Certainly, however, these future units will not be called UA, UEx, and UEy. These terms work well for discussing concepts and avoiding confusion with the current understanding of brigade and division capabilities. They do nothing, however, to evoke the continuity of spirit from its participants. Undoubtedly, the brigades of the future force will be called brigades. The division and corps will disappear in favor of their joint descendants. At these levels, the operational necessities of joint and interagency cooperation will flatten the organizational structure to produce the headquarters element, which is focused on coordination and support of autonomous action entities.

A MODULAR EXAMPLE

The future brigades will come in many flavors. Each will be tailored and focused toward completion of its part of a jointly integrated operation. In addition to the maneuver, aviation and reconnaissance brigades, there will also be sustainment, medical, distribution, and fires brigades. Each will be essential to the joint land operation, yet their autonomous nature will permit them to join the force as needed based on the specific requirement.

Unit sustainment of combat power is a good example to illustrate the new structure. The organic force structure dedicated to sustain these future brigade maneuver units is limited roughly to the equivalent of a present day forward support company. This minimal logistics footprint will be adequate to provide all combat support and combat service support functions. These Soldiers will be able to leverage the network centric capabilities afforded by the future logistics networks. The global combat service support information network will not only provide the right situational awareness and situational understanding, the information will be packaged to provide the maneuver brigade's logisticians with actionable

The brigade-sized Units of Action and the Land Force Headquarters Units of Employment are being designed to execute the Army's core competencies.

logistics intelligence as needed to accomplish the mission.

The sustainment UA will be configured to provide for all of the support service to the other units on the battlefield based on their inherent capabilities. There could be different sustainment UA for the different phases of the operation. Yet even this futuristic construct will be insufficient to provide all of the needed support from its own resources. The capability must come from the utilization of the supply chain. The primary role of the logisticians on the

battlefield will be to control and manage the many service providers who will be essential for the building and sustainment of combat power.

A strong logistics support relationship between the customer and the service providers, then, is critical to the sustainment of the UA. The logistics support provider will continue to be judged by timely performance. The future provider, however, will be in the form of contract suppliers of goods and services. The effectiveness of this contractor performance will become the primary role of the sustainment UA, and the future Army logistician.

To maintain an adequate logistics infrastructure on the battlefield, and simultaneously maintain a minimal logistics footprint, a shadow force of contractors will provide the logistics functions and services. Contractors are not visible to military force structure managers. The combination of private contractor-based suppliers on the battlefield and the military sustainment UA will make up the supply chain from America's industrial base to the land force customer.

MANY MODULES FOR MULTIPLE CAPABILITIES

Just as this simple example for the sustainment brigade quickly expands, so to will the capabilities-based future brigades connect together in a mutually supportive manner to operate under the joint UE headquarters. This year we are witnessing the transformation of the 3rd 10 brigades to the UA construct of the future. Next will be the 101st Air Assault brigades. Then we'll see the conversion of the 10th Mountain units, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 4th 10 brigades. The process will continue until the future Army will have 48 maneuver UA brigades.

Each of these future brigades will be separate, independent organization capable of deploying and operating independently from the support structure of the old division support organizations. In fact, we expect that each of these 48 new brigades will become capable of working with any UE (formerly division) to meet the demands of the mission of the land force. Each future brigade will maintain its relative capabilities. The five brigades from the 101st will maintain its airmobile capabilities, the five from the 10th will still be light mountain brigades, the 173rd will be airborne, and the five brigades from the 4th will possess all of the power of its mechanized heritage.

It becomes easy to imagine an operation that is headed by a JTF UEx formerly the 3rd 10 leading future UA brigades from each of the maneuver divisions discussed. More confusing, the various support U.S. brigades could come from this mix of division

pool of capabilities, or even from different organizations altogether. The communications UA may be from the 1st ID, the security UA from the 25th, and the Engineers from the 1st AD.

Consider that there will be at least five different types of support UA brigades. If we believe the future maneuver UA brigades will number 48, and there will be approximately 12 UEx and four UEy organizations, there will certainly be a need for 12 to 15 of each of the five different support brigades. We will soon be faced with the prospect of 120 brigade-sized UA units.

UNIT DESIGNATIONS

Managing 120 brigades created out of the current 10 division force structure creates an interesting problem. Currently all brigades in the 82nd Airborne Division wear the "All American" Soldier patch. Irrespective of the type of unit, whether Infantry or Artillery, Intelligence or Signal, Ordnance or Quartermaster, each unit is identified by its basic unit of deployment — that is the division. As we move to separate, autonomous, and independent brigades as the unit of deployment, our brigades will lose their division affinity. Strikingly, the supporting brigades of communicators, distributors, engineers, security and fires will more often than not be deployed separate from their parent UE. This new construct threatens to dissipate Soldiers' affinity for their unit.

To rectify the situation, the natural decision is to move the focus from the division to the brigade. The future module properly looks to the brigade for a specific capability. The future brigade as the unit of deployment will become an autonomous entity on the battlefield. Even as they work as part of a UE team, their duties and mission will be temporary. Soldiers will identify with their UA brigade just as today they identify with their division.

We run the risk of the division fading into the role of quaint heraldry the way the regiment has retreated in importance. We still have a sense of affinity with our regiment, and we will probably keep a feeling of pride in our division. Yet, the immediate camaraderie will be tainted as time and operations separate one soldier's experience and perceptions. Unit esprit de corps does bridge generations. Sky Soldiers

who served in the jungle do bond with their later counterparts who served in the desert. Still, how many members of the 9th Infantry Regiment (Manchu) share the same bond with a fellow Manchu even after discovering that one served in Korea while the other was in Alaska?

It will streamline unit differentiation well as task organization to identify UA brigades. By naming them and providing them a visible symbol, these brigades will take on their separate identity. We will avoid confusion when two air assault maneuver brigades, a mountain engineer brigade, a mechanized reconnaissance brigade and an air assault security brigade join a mountain UE for an operation.

Which brigade becomes designated 1st Brigade? How do we designate the two air assault brigades differently? Does the mountain brigade have special "precedence" because the UE is a mountain UE? Command and control becomes much easier if we name each UA brigade separately with a capabilities related unit identity.

RESURRECTING THE 92ND

Since the future UA brigade will perform with the autonomy and freedom of action of our current divisions, and the division structure will dissolve in favor of the joint UE force, it makes sense to designate the UA brigades with the names we now use for divisions. By leveraging the division colors and flourishes, the Army will sustain its sense of history and continuity. Also valuable is the comfort derived from leveraging the present sense of affiliation to the currently active units.

There are more than sufficient division units to cover the requirement. Coincidentally, there were 48 American infantry divisions in the European Theater in 1945. That's not counting the armored or artillery divisions in theater, or the 21 Army divisions in the Pacific Theater. The supporting UA brigades would also be designated according to the capability they brought to the battlefield. The 95th Military Police Brigade and the 2nd Signal Brigade could support the 92nd Airborne Infantry Brigade. Special units, sustainment and RSTA units will pick up their current affiliation or be

supplied with resurrected unit designations through the U.S. Army's Institute of Heraldry. Even smaller units could be designated to meet particular tasks. After 60 years, the return of the 766th Tank Battalion would surely be welcome.

So the most difficult upgrade to our units may not be a new system or a new tactic for conducting a procedure. To become the future UA brigade, our current brigades will be expected to undergo the stress of change and detachment from their division. The resulting impact will cross all of the DTLOMPF domains to become an autonomous force provider of significant capability. Forty-eight modular maneuver combat brigades and an undefined

number of unspecified support brigades will provide the land power of tomorrow.


This organizational change is happening. Our acceptance of the new concepts and the risk associated with this change becomes a valuable goal. One way to gain that acceptance is to reach back to our colorful past to solve an identification problem.

By making our units of deployment sport the patches of the distinguished units of our past, we perpetuate the tradition of excellence and ease the tension of progress into the future.



Robert Gosciewski is a Department of the Army civilian who attended the U.S. Army War College while assigned as a logistician for the Southern European Task Force located in Vicenza, Italy. A former paratrooper, Gosciewski served with the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade as well as the 559th USAAG. He was a distinguished military graduate at the University of Pennsylvania. He also holds a Master of Science degree from Boston University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Mr. Gosciewski's two decades of federal service include various technical and managerial positions in Alaska, California, Germany, Italy, and Virginia. Additionally, his experiences in the private sector include international operations and information services. A Certified Professional Logistician, Mr. Gosciewski is particularly interested in the sustainment of combat power for the future force on the battlefield. He became interested in brigade identification while researching the use of separate brigades and specialized units.



A Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Urban Combat

ARTHUR A. DURANTE

As the first week in April 2003 drew to a close, the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) had completed its wearying drive north from Kuwait and was poised to attack Baghdad and bring an end to Saddam's brutal regime. In less than three weeks, it had driven hundreds of miles, fought off hordes of fanatic Fedayeen outside the cities of southern Iraq, endured three days of choking sand and dust storms, fought its way up and over the Najaf escarpment, bulled through the Karbala Gap, and forced a crossing of the Euphrates River. Now, it controlled three major blocking positions to the south, west, and northwest of Baghdad.

On the 5th of April, the division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) had sent a powerful armored force on a slashing, explosive, highly publicized drive north that burst through the heart of the city and then out again to the airport in the west, in what the troops later came to call a "Thunder Run." The audacity of this bold reconnaissance-in-force surprised the Iraqis and gave the U.S. commander a much better idea of what he would face in the city. Despite the American success, however, the Iraqi propaganda from its official spokesman, known to the Americans as "Baghdad Bob," depicted the Thunder Run as a defeat for the Americans and trumpeted to the world that the defenders of the city had repulsed an attack.

To the west, the 3rd Infantry Division's 1st BCT under Colonel Will Grimsley was consolidating its positions around the Baghdad International Airport (also known as Objective LIONS). The 1st BCT had seized the airport in a daring night attack on 3 April and then, reinforced by elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), held it against furious Iraqi counterattacks. Task Force 2-7 Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rutter, was expanding the 1st BCT's control eastward along

the main highway heading into the heart of the city but the fighting was fierce and the progress slow.

To the south, the powerful 2nd BCT, reinforced by TF 1-15 Infantry from the 3rd BCT and under the command of Colonel Dave Perkins, was sitting firmly in Objective SAINTS, which it had seized on 4 April. Objective SAINTS was an industrial complex along Highway 8 that dominated the road net heading northward into the city. On 2 April, Task Force 1-15 Infantry had led the 3rd Infantry Division attack across the Euphrates River to seize this decisive terrain for V Corps. It was the intersection of every key highway leading into the south and west areas of Baghdad. Every subsequent attack into Baghdad and against the Baghdad Airport would first pass through Objective SAINTS.

Although the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was fast approaching Baghdad from the southeast and would eventually seal off the city east of the Tigris River, V Corps still had to isolate the city from the north in order to set the conditions for the final attack against Saddam's capital and the heart of the regime. The 3rd Infantry Division's commander, Major General Buford Blount, identified a key area north of the city center as the next objective to complete the isolation in the V Corps zone. He designated this area as Objective TITANS. (The Army gave many of the major Army objectives around Baghdad the names of professional football teams.)

The 3rd BCT commander, Colonel Dan Allyn, knew that soon he would be called on to complete the ring of tanks and fighting vehicles around Baghdad.

The 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd BCT is known around the Army by its nickname, "the Sledgehammer Brigade." It had been heavily engaged around the city of Karbala since the first of April. Two of its combat elements, TF 1-30 Infantry and TF 2-69 Armor, had

been fighting a frustrating and wearying battle to contain Iraqi irregulars in the city while the rest of the brigade combat team protected the division and corps units passing through the Karbala Gap.

By 2 April, TF 2-69 Armor, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, had fought its way to a desolate stretch of highway about 10 kilometers southeast of Karbala. It was here that his sister battalion in the 3rd BCT, TF 1-15 Infantry, had fought a fierce battle against fanatical Iraqi Infantry in trenches and bunkers astride the highway two days earlier while under COL Perkins' command. Even this punishment had not diminished the Iraqi desire to make headlong and often seemingly suicidal attacks against the long convoys of the 3rd Infantry Division streaming towards the gap between the city of Karbala and the large freshwater lake further to the west.

Late that afternoon, LTC Sanderson was ordered to attack with his task force up along the eastern side of the city, to contain the Iraqi forces and to cut off their reinforcements from the north. The night was exceptionally black, with no moon. Low, dark clouds blocked even the dim light of the desert stars. The task force commander made the comment that it was so dark that he was actually under "negative illumination."

Despite this handicap, TF 2-69 Armor ground its way inexorably northward to isolate the eastern side of the city. During this advance, it came under fire from sophisticated RPG ambushes from well-prepared fighting positions as well as by

suicide bombers, leading the commander to fear that he was facing "professional terrorists." The roads on which the tanks were moving turned to dirt and became narrower as they entered the irrigated farmlands close to the city. The lush vegetation reminded many Soldiers of scenes they had watched on TV showing the jungle fighting in Vietnam. The fighting was so close that tank commanders were using their 9mm pistols to shoot at Iraqi RPG gunners who would rise up from the roadside and fire rockets at point-blank range.

Task Force 1-30 Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wes Gillman, moved north also and tightened the ring around Karbala, hooking south and fighting fierce but small-scale local counterattacks as together they compressed the enemy forces into smaller and smaller areas of the city.

Even while it was coordinating these efforts to isolate Karbala with tank and mechanized Infantry forces, the 3rd BCT staff was busy coordinating with the 2nd BCT of the 101st Airborne Division as it moved to assume the mission. Transferring responsibility for clearing the enemy out of Karbala to the 101st Airborne Division would free the 3rd BCT for its next task. The 101st Airborne Division assumed responsibility for the Karbala area on 5 April, and the 3rd BCT immediately began to reposition and move north to prepare for the upcoming combat operations in Baghdad.

With the next fight looming, the 3rd BCT went through several changes in its

task organization. Earlier, the 1-10th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Harding, and TF 1-15 Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Charlton, had been sent to reinforce the 2nd BCT as it seized Objective SAINTS. LTC Harding arrayed the 1-10th FA's massive 155mm howitzers in firing positions in the southern section of Objective SAINTS, helping to isolate Baghdad from any remaining Iraqi forces that might move along Highway 8.

The Infantrymen and tankers of TF 1-15 Infantry, which had borne the bulk of the combat during the initial seizure of Objective SAINTS were still in place there, helping to secure the ground and to fend off the groups of Iraqis making scattered but deadly attacks with small arms, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

Late in the afternoon on 5 April, the 3rd BCT received an order that was to bring both the 1-10th Field Artillery and TF 1-15 Infantry back to their habitual organization. For the first time since the early fighting around the southern town of An Nasyria, the 3rd BCT would be back together again, this time for its attack into Baghdad.

Just after dawn on the morning of 6 April, LTC Harding and LTC Charlton met with COL Allyn at a road junction on Highway 1 in Objective SAINTS. They were there to get the final order for the attack to seize Objective TITANS and complete the isolation of Baghdad. Standing in a small group next to the road, the officers quickly copied the maneuver graphics onto their maps and completed their final coordination.

There was electricity in the air when COL Allyn met with his commanders beside the road in Objective SAINTS. As LTC Harding put it, "It was a great feeling for us to be together again. We were as pumped up as we could be! There was no apprehension at all about attacking Baghdad. It was all clicking like clockwork by then."

In normal times, the 3rd BCT isn't stationed at Fort Stewart with the rest of the 3rd Infantry Division. Its home is 200 miles away at Fort Benning, Georgia, where it's the only mechanized Infantry and armor force on post. The organization was exceptionally close-knit, not just because of its geographic isolation from the remainder of the 3rd Infantry Division, but



Specialist Adam Nuelken

Major John Seagars, the executive officer for Task Force 2-69 Armor, walks down a Baghdad street while an Abrams tank patrols to his right in April 2003.




Figure 1 - 3rd BCT Scheme of Maneuver

also because of what its Soldiers had gone through together over the past year.

In 2002, the 3rd BCT had completed a grueling train-up and then a six-month deployment to Kuwait. It had come home for less than three months and then, in January 2003, deployed again to confront Iraq in this war. The men had trained at the National Training Center together, deployed together, trained in Kuwait for six months, come home for a while, and then returned for another round of rigorous training in the desert of Kuwait. The brigade was emotionally taunt, desert-hardened, and cohesive to a degree unknown since World War II.

Unit cohesion notwithstanding, since crossing the border and seizing Tallil Airbase in the opening days of the war, the full brigade had not fought as a single integrated unit. One or more of the maneuver task forces had always been detached and fighting under the command of other brigade combat teams.

LTC Sanderson's TF 2-69 Armor had been detached from the 3rd BCT immediately after the fight at Tallil Air Base and sent to the 1st BCT. It was with the "Raiders" of 1st BCT that TF 2-69 Armor fought a ferocious battle at Al Kifl.

LTC Charlton's TF 1-15 Infantry had been passed to the control of the 2nd BCT as it fought northwestward along Highway 9 through the town of As Samawa and towards Karbala. This unit had fought a long, wearying, and confused battle against determined but uncoordinated Iraqi resistance along Highway 9 and in a large expanse of bunkers and trench lines several kilometers outside Karbala. Earlier, one of its mechanized Infantry and tank company teams (B Company, under Captain Dough Philippone) had even been sent on an independent mission almost 75 kilometers west of the main body, where it seized and held a major bridge over the Euphrates for several days, preventing any Iraqi counterattacks.

Even the 3rd BCT's direct support artillery battalion had been

sent to support other units several times, eventually firing in support of all of the maneuver brigades of the 3rd Division at one time or another. For now, however, for this vital mission, the men and women of the 3rd BCT would be together again ... and they were elated with the prospect. It was their turn to step up to the plate.

Moving Out

At 0508 hours on 6 April, the lead element of COL Allyn's 3rd BCT, TF 2-69 Armor, crossed the line of departure at Objective PEACH, the main crossing of the Euphrates River, and began a 110-kilometer attack to the northwest and north. More than 60 kilometers of that attack would be conducted under heavy fire from defending Iraqi forces.

The 3rd BCT moved from its assembly areas west of the Euphrates and crossed the river using the recently captured highway bridge and the auxiliary floating bridge put in by the combat engineers. It then continued northeasterly along Route CUB into Objective SAINTS where TF 1-15 Infantry and 1-10 Field Artillery had been fighting as part of the 2nd BCT. Task Force 1-15 Infantry joined the massive column there, and now together again, these units made the turn to the northwest towards Objective MONTGOMERY.

Objective MONTGOMERY was a blocking position at the intersection of Highways 1 and 10, almost due west of the Baghdad International Airport being held by COL Grimsley's 1st BCT. Alpha Troop, 3-7 Cavalry held Objective MONTGOMERY, guarding the western flank of the 3rd BCT moving north towards Objective TITANS and providing advance warning of any major Iraqi counterattack from the northwest. Manning such an isolated blocking position was a classic cavalry mission, and the troopers on Objective MONTGOMERY were executing it with all the style and panache the Army has come to expect of them.

Delta Troop, 10th Cavalry, the 3rd BCT's organic reconnaissance troop, led the brigade's powerful main effort, the M1 tanks and the Bradley fighting vehicles of TF 2-69 Armor, northwest along the major highway towards Objective MONTGOMERY. There, it linked up with the battle-hardened troopers of the 3-7 Cavalry. This position marked the northern and western extent of the ground secured by the 3rd Infantry Division. As LTC Harding described it, "Past that point, it was all Indian country." The 3rd BCT columns made the turn at the cavalry outpost, heading back northeast now, towards the Tigris River, but now north of the center of Baghdad.

After the light-skinned reconnaissance vehicles of Delta Troop, the 3rd BCT's order of march had a tank and mechanized Infantry team, known as Team Assassin (A Company, 2-69 Armor,

commanded by CPT Stu James) leading. The next combined arms team, known as Team Hard Rock, built around C Company, 1-15 Infantry, followed Team Assassin. The TF 2-69 Armor combat trains were next, nestled close behind the combat vehicles for protection. Then came COL Allyn's tactical command post in two tracked vehicles, followed by elements of B Company, 317th Engineers, then the tank-pure C Company, 2-69 Armor. Following TF 2-69 Armor were the howitzers of 1-10th Field Artillery, which were themselves followed by TF 1-30 Infantry. The combat-scarred vehicles of TF 1-15 Infantry brought up the rear. The powerful column stretched for miles along the narrow highway route.

COL Allyn was riding in his HMMWV and not the armored vehicle he normally used. His M113 had broken down and could not be fixed because of a lack of repair parts. Rather than take a replacement vehicle from one of his subordinates, the BCT commander chose to risk the ride in the light unarmored HMMWV, a move that came close to costing him his life later.

First Contact

As TF 2-69 Armor passed through the checkpoint manned by A Troop, 3-7 Cavalry at Objective MONTGOMERY, the young Cavalry troop commander advised

COL Allyn and LTC Sanderson that there had been firefights around his position all night and that they should expect imminent enemy contact as soon as they cleared the checkpoint. Several officers remembered the A Troop commander saying, "Once you get 300 meters up that road, you're going to make contact."

The weary cavalryman knew what he was talking about. By that time in the war, they almost always did. The reconnaissance HMMWVs of D Troop pulled over and let the heavy tanks of TF 2-69 Armor take the lead. The tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles of Team Assassin immediately moved into a combat formation as they cleared the cavalry positions. (See Figure 1- 3rd BCT Scheme of Maneuver)

Objective SMITH, the first of many road junctions 3rd BCT planned to seize, was located in a small cluster of buildings and homes where the highway made an "S" turn to the east and then back north. At 0850 hours, TF 2-69 Armor's lead elements entering Objective SMITH came under small arms and RPG fire. They returned fire and the engagement rapidly escalated, with the Iraqis opening up with mortars and artillery fire. The task force engaged and destroyed at least one T-72 tank and there were several other Iraqi armored vehicles firing from reveted positions within the urban area.

The battle began to settle into a pattern. As the company team approached the vicinity of the objective, it would come under heavy small arms and RPG fire from multiple directions. This was the beginning of a 10-hour, nonstop running battle to defeat the enemy in Objective TITANS, a huge area with hundreds of buildings, several significant canals, and two major bridges. Its seizure by 3rd BCT would complete the isolation of the city on the west of the Tigris River. (See Figure 2 - 3rd BCT Objectives in TITANS)


COL Allyn, traveling close behind TF 2-69 Armor, continually called for artillery fires from the 1-10th Field Artillery. At the same time, he targeted the Iraqi armor and bunkers with close air support from Air Force A-10 Warthogs. Although they never slackened the fires they were delivering in support of TF 2-69 Armor, LTC Harding's artillerymen came under heavy attack themselves at this time. They were forced to defend their position while still feeding the heavy shells into the howitzers and pounding the enemy with deadly volleys.

Almost as soon as the howitzer crews had fired the first rounds in support of TF 2-69 Armor at Objective SMITH, they began to receive heavy indirect fire as well as direct fires from groups of Iraqis using small arms and RPGs. Some of the Iraqi gunners even launched their rockets from behind buildings, aiming them high in the air so as to arc up and over before coming down in the artillery firing positions. Despite the incoming fire, the howitzers continued to pound away at the enemy in Objective SMITH.

3rd BCT fought through Objective SMITH, receiving continuous fire as the entire brigade formation passed. As each unit passed through, there was intermittent contact with individual Iraqi military vehicles, civilian trucks mounting automatic weapons, and small groups of Iraqis fighting on foot with small arms and the ubiquitous RPG. Objective SMITH was troublesome for a long time. The fire from the area around the overpass waxed and waned, but it didn't cease completely until the Soldiers of TF 1-30 Infantry deployed and pushed the Iraqis out of the adjacent area later.

As called for in the 3rd BCT plan, Task Force 1-15 Infantry turned 90 degrees eastward near Objective SMITH and began

Figure 2 - 3rd BCT Objectives in TITANS



to clear enemy positions in its zone. It attacked and secured a large maintenance facility that COL Allyn would later use for the Brigade Support Area. The task force made significant enemy contact from the beginning. During one of the nearly continuous firefights, an RPG wounded the commander of B Company, 1-64 Armor but he was able to return to his unit the next day.

As the task force's lead element, Team Baker (built around Bravo Company 1-15 Infantry, commanded by Captain Doug Philippone) rolled under an overpass, the number one tank spotted an enemy T-72 with his cannon oriented directly on the company column. The American tank fired first and the T-72 erupted into flames. As the column bypassed the burning wreckage on the narrow road, the commander of the probing Abrams spotted another Iraqi tank and destroyed it as well.

The fighting was so confused, and at such confined quarters, that one of the B Company Bradley fighting vehicles smashed into one of the burning Iraqi tanks during the melee and the vehicle commander suffered a severe concussion. The company destroyed more than 20 military vehicles and 10 Iraqi artillery pieces during this fight.

As TF 1-15 Infantry battled the Iraqis in the urban area east of the main route, TF 2-69 Armor continued north to Objective CUSTER, a sharp right turn at a canal that marked the brigade's northern boundary. LTC Sanderson described the 40-kilometer route from Objective SMITH to Objective CUSTER as "a constant gauntlet of fire."

It was along this route that an M113 armored personnel carrier of the 317th Engineers was hit with an RPG that killed Private Gregory P. Huxley, the first fatal casualty of the day. Later, PVT Huxley's comrades would create an informal memorial to their fallen friend on the side of the APC, and an unknown photographer would make it famous, but for now, the attack continued without pause.

At 1136 hours, Team Assassin (TF 2-69 Armor) destroyed a company-sized element of Iraqi mechanized vehicles along the canal. At Objective CUSTER, the sharp turn to the east along the canal road, TF 2-69 Armor engaged and destroyed several BMPs and T-62 tanks along with at least 18 BM-21 rocket launchers.

A bizarre sight greeted Team Assassin as it made the turn to the east on the canal road. Standing almost in the middle of the highway were several Iraqi officers busy stripping off their uniforms to reveal the civilian clothes they were wearing beneath. In full uniform or not, they were armed combatants who were making no offer of surrender. They were shot and killed before they could complete their change of clothing.

LTC Sanderson was determined that he would not allow his attack to become bogged down fighting every single Iraqi element he ran into. His mission was to move rapidly to the north of the city and to seal it off, not to have a long, drawn-out fight in the built-up area. He pushed the task force to keep moving. If he received fire from a sniper on a roof, he used artillery, tank fire, or CAS to bring the building down and then move on.

The commander of TF 2-69 Armor moved far to the front of the lengthy column. His tank was just behind the commander of

"It was always comforting to see the A-10s coming in. The field artillery support was spot-on. You couldn't have asked for a better artillery barrage."

**— LTC J.R. Sanderson
TF 2-69 commander**

Team Assassin who was following his lead tank platoon. LTC Sanderson, along with the battalion fire support officer, Captain Andy McLean, and the USAF air liaison officer in his M113, were all grouped close together right behind CPT James, the team commander.

As they moved along the canal road, artillery support from 1-10th Field Artillery was falling to the left of the road while low-flying CAS aircraft were engaging any Iraqi

force directly to the front. The pilot reports from these CAS aircraft, A-10s, F-15s and F-16s were keeping the task force informed on what to expect as it advanced. LTC Sanderson said, "It was always comforting to see the A-10s coming in. The field artillery support was spot-on. You couldn't have asked for a better artillery barrage."

As the 3rd BCT was fighting Iraqi forces in Objective TITANS, the 3-7 Cavalry was still maintaining the guard on the western flank at Objective MONTGOMERY. At 1232 hours, the cavalry destroyed eight T-72s along with a BMP as they attacked the outnumbered but not out-gunned troop. Five of the T-72s were reported as having reactive armor and that drew considerable attention from everyone who heard the report. If it were accurate, it might mean that the most modern and well-equipped elements of the Iraqi Republican Guards were attacking. Throughout the day there were reports from various sources of Iraqi convoys attempting to escape from the city to the north and west.

At 1308 hours, the 3rd Infantry Division's assistant division commander discussed the combat team's progress with COL Allyn. Everyone was beginning to realize that Baghdad was literally an "armed camp." There were heavy anti-aircraft weapons, artillery, tanks, BMPs and other military equipment everywhere the unit turned.

There were so many huge secondary explosions from the destroyed Iraqi vehicles, and they were so close to the road TF 2-69 Armor was using, that LTC Sanderson was thinking about his combat and field trains, worried that the wheeled vehicles might not be able to make it through to him. Large chunks of debris from exploding Iraqi tanks and BMPs often blocked the road. Many HMMWVs were driving with flat tires because of all the sharp metal fragments.

By 1530 hours, the 3rd BCT had seized Objective PATTON, the north/south intersection of Highway 1 where it crossed over the canal. LTC Sanderson assigned responsibility for Objective PATTON to Captain Carter Price, commander of C Company, 2-69 Armor. Most elements of the task force field trains stopped there within CPT Price's protective perimeter until they were called to come out and conduct refuel and resupply later in the day.

After C Company was established on Objective PATTON, TF 2-69 Armor moved far to the south, seized Objective MONTY, and began to clear the areas around it. This was the most critical of the task force's objectives, the main highway bridge over the Tigris River in Objective TITANS. Captain Stu James and his Team Assassin secured the bridge and several buildings around the approaches.

Soon afterwards the tank and mechanized infantry forces of Team Hard Rock attacked the bridge at Objective ROMMEL,

where the canal intersected the Tigris River. This movement was made from south to north and for the moment it completed the TF 2-69 Armor plan for seizing crossing sites on the Tigris.

Things were fairly quiet until about 1830 hours when dismounted Iraqi infantry attacked the TF 2-69 Armor combat trains near Objective MONTY. COL Allyn, still traveling in his HMMWV close behind TF 2-69 Armor, had pulled into the grounds of the Iraqi Petroleum Institute and stopped near some 2,500-gallon fuel tankers and a heavily loaded ammunition truck. The attackers poured a surprise burst of fire into these tempting targets and at the commander's vulnerable HMMWV. Quick return fire from LTC Harding's Bradley and from elements of TF 2-69 Armor eliminated the threat to the brigade commander, but not before the ammunition truck had been hit.

The ammunition carried in the truck caught fire and began to cook off. Despite the best efforts of the drivers and other Soldiers of the combat trains, the fire quickly spread from the ammunition truck to one of the fuel tankers. Both vehicles were completely destroyed and several Soldiers were wounded. Sadly, Private Kelly Prewitt, a member of the Support Platoon, received mortal injuries while defending his vehicle in this brief but deadly fight. Despite the best efforts of the battalion medics, PVT Prewitt died while being evacuated.

At about this time, CPT Price on Objective PATTON came under attack by dismounted Iraqi forces moving through some buildings near the crossing site on the canal. Knowing that the tank-pure C Company lacked supporting infantry, LTC Sanderson gathered a small scratch force made up of the men and vehicles around his command post. This ad hoc group, including LTC Sanderson in his Bradley fighting vehicle, CPT Rappaport, the commander of Team Hard Rock in his, an artillery fire support team vehicle and one other Bradley moved to the north quickly to assist the tankers.

Just after the threat to Objective PATTON was repulsed, the Iraqis counterattacked against both the northern and southern ends of the U.S. positions at the bridge over the Tigris near Objective MONTY. The attacking force initially consisted of dismounted infantry, but several T-72 tanks and BMPs soon joined in. There was significant fighting there, the start of what turned out to be more than 60 hours of combat for Objective MONTY. The fighting swirled around the objective, and the situation was often unclear, but COL Allyn thought the Iraqis were attempting to breakout of Baghdad or at least to open Highway 1 as an escape route for other forces still within the city.

One Iraqi T-72 made it within 300 meters of the bridge before it was destroyed. Task Force 2-69 Armor defeated this initial counterattack and at 1912 hours, the 3rd BCT reported to 3rd Infantry Division headquarters that the situation was under control at all locations, at least for now. LTC Sanderson conferred with COL Allyn and requested that he attach another maneuver



U.S. Army photo

A 3rd Infantry Division Soldier sits atop his Bradley in Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.

company to the task force in order to secure the most southern area of Objective TITANS, a site designated as Objective BRADLEY. COL Allyn agreed and attached A Company 1-15 Infantry to TF 2-69 Armor.

As the sun began to set on April 6th, the combat team had forces arrayed across the breadth of Objective TITANS. Task Force 1-15 Infantry, having detached its Alpha Company, was oriented to the south, controlling the routes into the objective area. All was not quiet there, however, and the unit engaged and destroyed three tanks late in the afternoon. Task Force 1-30 Infantry was clearing the last Iraqi die-hards out of the urban area around Objective SMITH while D Troop 10th Cavalry occupied Objective CUSTER in the northwest. Task Force 2-69 Armor had company-sized forces on Objectives PATTON, ROMMEL, MONTY and BRADLEY.

The first day's fight to isolate the city in the 3rd Infantry Division's zone was nearly complete. The 3rd BCT had fought through elements of the Special Republican Guard, the HAMMURABI Republican Guards Division, and possibly the Iraqi force's Corps Artillery. The stage was now set for further attacks into the city, but the Iraqis had not given up. The quiet of early evening was soon to be shattered.

The Fight Renews – Objective MONTY

Although the 3rd BCT's area of operations was calm in the early evening, the Iraqis attacked fiercely just after it became fully dark. A significant amount of indirect fire fell on Objectives ROMMEL and MONTY. Counterfire from 1-10th Field Artillery lashed out and the competing explosions reverberated back and forth across the river. The objectives were close enough to each other that Soldiers on one could see and hear the rounds landing on the others.

The Iraqis followed up their artillery and mortar fire with a powerful combined arms attack against Objective MONTY using tanks, BMPs and dismounted Infantry. Unfortunately for them, Team Hard Rock, holding Objective ROMMEL, had observed them

as they moved southeastward along the riverbank. Although the Iraqis were out of direct fire range, the fire support team with the company engaged with indirect fire and sent reports that alerted the men of A Company, 2-69 Armor on the bridge at Objective MONTY to the impending attack.

According to LTC Sanderson, both artillery and CAS were extremely effective due in large measure to the Army's fielding of the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST). This vehicle has an integrated laser that allows precision targeting and subsequent increased lethality from supporting fires.

The Iraqis made a concerted effort to seize the bridge at MONTY. The fighting lasted all night and into the early morning of April 7th. COL Allyn called multiple air strikes against the enemy armored vehicles firing on the friendly positions from across the Tigris. As the pressure against the bridge mounted, 3rd BCT brought concentrated fires from USAF CAS, field artillery, and TF 2-69 Armor's powerful 120mm mortars to bear. This, combined with the direct fire of the 120mm tank guns and the deadly 25mm cannons of the Bradley fighting vehicles, destroyed many Iraqi armored vehicles. Despite the losses they took, the Iraqis pressed their attacks closer and closer to the bridge.

At one point in the battle, the Iraqis even moved a heavy construction crane into

position, apparently in an attempt to remove some of the destroyed vehicles that were by now blocking the bridge approaches. This crane was detected as it slowly crawled its way past the alert infantrymen on Objective ROMMEL. The fire support team from the 1-10th Field Artillery called in the artillery fires that destroyed it.

At approximately 0600 hours on April 7th, the Iraqi attack reached its peak. According to observers, the enemy had "tons of stuff on the other side of the river." There was an entire Engineer bridge company with all its vehicles and equipment in addition to the large Iraqi Infantry force armed with RPGs, heavy machine guns, and mortars.

As a company-sized enemy force closed in on his position, the commander of A Company, 2-69 Armor sent a radio message that had not been heard in this war until then. He called for the supporting artillery to fire his final protective fires (FPF).

Commanders in a defense designate a line just outside of their positions where, if the defense gets desperate, all guns and other weapons systems available fire along this line, theoretically creating a protective wall of fire. Calling for an FPF is, in understated Army parlance, "a significant emotional event." It meant that the situation, while perhaps not critical, was certainly serious. It was getting "really

serious" on Objective MONTY.

Fortunately, the company's fire support team was well prepared. It had not only plotted the FPF earlier in the day during a lull in contact, it had actually been able to adjust the impact of live rounds until they were hitting precisely where they were needed. The gunners of the 1-10th Field Artillery entered the firing data into the computerized systems of their Paladin howitzers. The battalion heavy mortar platoon did the same with their simpler mortar ballistic computers, and waited for the call.

When the order came to fire the FPF, 1-10th Field Artillery unleashed 30 minutes of continuous rapid fire, pounding the attacking Iraqis and placing a protective wall in front of the hard-pressed American forces. In addition to the artillery and mortar FPF, the 3rd BCT also called in more Air Force close air support, smashing the final Iraqi assault just short of the bridge. As LTC Sanderson said, "The enemy was in a caldron there. The A-10s were at treetop level doing strafing runs against enemy columns."

But the infantrymen and tankers were not the only Soldiers in close combat with the Iraqis. As it was repositioning to better support the brigade, A Battery, 1-10th Field Artillery did something few artillerymen have ever done. It engaged and destroyed two T-72 tanks using direct fire. The Iraqi tanks were hidden under the trees across a canal from the howitzer battery. The huge 155mm explosive projectiles smashed the enemy tanks and the battery continued its movement.

The Iraqis continued their efforts to recapture the bridges over the Tigris, making at least two significant efforts to cross the bridges at Objective MONTY. COL Allyn was short of combat forces to defend them all. He requested permission to blow up both the bridges and deny them to the Iraqis. This would free his forces from static defensive positions and allow them to continue to clear the remaining portions of Objective TITANS on the west side of the river.

Initially this request was denied, but a strange situation developed at Objective MONTY concerning the bridge there. At the same time that COL Allyn was requesting permission to destroy it, Iraqi infiltrators were working to do the very same thing themselves. It is a clear



Specialist Daniel T. Dark

Army Public Affairs officials and other media representatives interview Captain Stew James of Task Force 2-69 Armor regarding the fighting at Objective MONTY April 6, 2003.

measure of the intensity and confusion of the fighting when one considers that both sides felt it would be to their tactical advantage to destroy the same bridge at the same time.

Working undetected, Iraqi sappers managed to put explosives on the eastern abutment of the bridge and actually dropped part of it. The destruction was not complete, however, and the bridge remained useable. Later, permission came down for COL Allyn to destroy the bridge at Objective ROMMEL. The Air Force dropped the span neatly on the second try with a pair of precision-guided bombs.

Intense fighting raged around the perimeter of Objective TITANS for the next two days. COL Allyn had been told that Marines from I MEF would link up with his forces from the other side of the Tigris within 12 to 15 hours, but the Marine attack was stalled and did not arrive until more than two days later, on the 9th of April. This delay allowed the Iraqis east of the Tigris River to concentrate their attacks against the HAMMER Brigade in Objective TITANS.

On April 8th, the third day of the fight in TITANS, the 3rd BCT sent TF 1-15 Infantry attacking south towards Objective LIONS (the Baghdad Airport), which was still held by 1st BCT. The Iraqis were far from beaten. They still had significant forces and they knew how to use their weapons. During this attack, a supporting A-10 Warthog was hit by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and severely damaged. The pilot managed to guide his craft towards friendly forces and ejected near Objective PEACH where he was recovered.

Task Force 1-15 Infantry attacked along the Abu Ghurayb Highway to seize an electrical substation, Objective ORACLE, and two key highway intersections, Objective TRINITY and Objective NEO. LTC Charlton began his attack with B Company, 1-64 Armor in the lead followed by B and then A Companies, 1-15 Infantry. Heavy artillery, mortar, and close air support fires along the highway and on top of both objectives preceded the attack. At Objective TRINITY, B Company, 1-64 Armor received fire from enemy forces under the overpass and engaged with direct and indirect fire, killing approximately 20 enemies and destroying several trucks.

The tank company continued to attack through to Objective NEO, destroying many enemy Infantry enroute and destroying or disabling 20 artillery pieces. It established blocking positions in the vicinity of the grid line at 37 Easting, and there it withstood heavy enemy anti-armor and small arms fire. An enemy anti-tank weapon penetrated the turret armor of one of the tanks and wounded the crew but the company continued fighting until all enemies at that position were destroyed.

Team Baker (B Company, 1-15 Infantry) secured Objective TRINITY when B Company, 1-64 AR moved into position around Objective NEO. Both companies continued to engage and destroy enemy counterattacks throughout the day. The TF 1-15 Infantry commander was positioned with his Bradley fighting vehicle on the road between the two objectives and from there he engaged and destroyed three enemy trucks that were counterattacking into the task force.

That afternoon (8 April 03) the LTC Charlton ordered B Company, 1-15 Infantry and B Company, 1-64 Armor to seize Objective ORACLE and ordered A Company, 1-15 INF, recently returned from assisting TF 2-69 Armor, to move to and assume



Staff Sergeant Kevin P. Bell

3rd Infantry Division Soldiers apprehend a civilian walking in an off-limits area of Baghdad April 15, 2003.

responsibility for Objectives NEO and TRINITY. Not long after A Company established its initial blocking positions on Objectives NEO and TRINITY, it began to receive heavy small arms and RPG fire.

The A Company commander used indirect fire on all the suspected Iraqi locations. This temporarily stopped the enemy fire. After about two hours of fighting, an RPG hit one of the unit's Bradley fighting vehicles while it was repositioning on the south side of the intersection. The vehicle was severely damaged, but the crew was not injured. In 24 hours, Team Able (A Company, 1-15 Infantry) destroyed 15 enemy vehicles and an unknown number of RPG teams. Throughout the night the positions continued to take random RPG rounds.

For the next two days, Task Force 1-15 Infantry continued to attack along the Abu Ghurayb Highway and cleared enemy forces in its zone. On 11 April, CPT Philippone, Commander of B Company 1-15 Infantry, received reports that there were 50 Syrian and Palestinian fighters occupying a road intersection in a commercial district in Baghdad ten kilometers southeast of the Task Force, in the 2nd BCT zone. Seizing this opportunity, LTC Charlton proposed to COL Allyn and COL Perkins that he immediately launch an attack against that force. The mission was approved and LTC Charlton ordered CPT Philippone and his B Company, 1-15 Infantry to conduct the attack.

The source of the information CPT Philippone received reported that the enemy was waiting for U.S. forces to move through an intersection so they could ambush them. The B Company commander organized his force into two elements, each with a tank section supporting a Bradley platoon.

The first element attacked the western portion of the intersection and the second attacked the eastern. Both attacked rapidly and as the combat vehicles established attack-by-fire positions around the intersection, the Infantry dismounted and began to clear the area.

CPT Philippone's attack achieved total surprise and quickly killed a large number of enemy personnel. The western element received heavy RPG and small arms fire from three directions. The company executive officer identified the enemy fires as coming from a building and began to suppress the building with tank and

Bradley fire. The combat vehicles continued to fire on the buildings and bunkers while the infantry cleared buildings and alleys around the intersection. Many of the enemy forces pretended to be dead only to engage the Americans when they came to search them. All of the enemy bunkers were rigged with booby traps.

B Company, 1-64 Armor also conducted an urban raid on 11 April based on another human intelligence (HUMINT) report. It moved east on the Abu Ghurayb Highway to the 37 Easting grid line where enemy forces attacked it with RPGs, recoilless rifles, and small arms. The company reacted immediately to the contact and killed about 20 enemy personnel. One of the company's tanks was hit and penetrated by a recoilless rifle. Even though wounded, the crew continued to fight until it was later evacuated to the battalion aid station.

Task Force 1-15 retained control of Objectives TRINITY and NEO and cleared the Abu Ghurayb Highway and surrounding urban areas. The damage this fight did to the Iraqis was immense. The task force destroyed eight tanks, 58 BMPs, and 44 light armed trucks. It killed more than 150 Iraqi infantry and took 15 prisoners of war.

Early in the morning of April 10th, after clearing the remainder of Objective TITANS, 3rd BCT made its last major attack of the war. Task Force 2-69 Armor attacked south down the west side of the Tigris River along Highway 1 all the way to downtown Baghdad. There, it linked up with elements of the 2nd BCT that had stayed downtown after a second Thunder Run on April 7th.

This final attack by the 3rd BCT, supported by an elaborate program of preparatory fires, overwhelmed the weak and disorganized resistance put up by the Iraqis. Task Force 1-30 Infantry followed in support of TF 2-69 Armor and cleared out the last pockets of resistance. When COL Allyn's 3rd BCT completed the linkup with 2nd BCT in the heart of the city, it signaled that V Corps had completed its attack to seize and control Baghdad.

As resistance melted away, 3rd BCT forces occupied the area around the "Mother of All Mosques," a massive mosque complex in the center of Baghdad. The Soldiers discovered that the apartments across the street from the mosque were, in reality, an elaborate deception. Instead of real buildings, it was a false front that hid

a large Iraqi ammunition dump. Apparently this was an attempt by the Iraqis to use the Americans' reluctance to attack near a mosque as a way to protect their military supplies. It was not the only time the Americans discovered such ruses, but it was one of the most elaborate of them all.

As the fighting died down, the 3rd BCT consolidated its positions, reorganized its units, and moved into temporary locations as it made the sometimes difficult, often confusing transition from high intensity combat to urban stability operations. It would not return to the U.S. for several months but when it did, the troops were welcomed back to Fort Benning as heroes for what they had accomplished in the war.

This modern tank and mechanized infantry force had proven itself to be a powerful and lethal combat team, even in the concrete canyons of a major urban area. The Battle of Baghdad was over, but the insurgency in Iraq was just beginning.

Arthur A. Durante is currently serving as deputy chief of Doctrine, Doctrine and Collective Training Division, Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.



Sergeant Igor Paustovski

Soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division's TF 3-7 Cavalry guard a bridge in Baghdad on April 10, 2003.

TRAINING NOTES



MOUNTAIN LEADER ADVANCED RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP COURSE

Helping the Army, 10th Mountain Div Meet the Demands of Transformation

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL COSS
CAPTAIN ADAM SAWYER
FIRST SERGEANT SCOTT BAUGHN

Sergeant Jose Castro, a squad leader in C Company, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, prepared to assault a building in Afghanistan housing three suspected Taliban leaders. During his platoon's earlier rehearsal, he ensured that his Soldiers used the marksmanship and short range battle tactics, techniques, and procedures that his instructors taught him during the Mountain Leader Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (MLARM) course at Fort Drum, New York. His squad also rehearsed the proper techniques to subdue, restrain, and search prisoners that might be captured during the mission – additional skills taught to SGT Castro in the MLARM course. As his squad conducted the assault, SGT Castro observed with great satisfaction how accurate his Soldiers shot and how aggressively they applied the combatives techniques he taught them. Their skills resulted in the safe capture of the three suspected Taliban leaders. SGT Castro, like many other 10th Mountain Division (Light) NCOs, attributes their success to the advanced marksmanship and SRB techniques taught at Fort Drum's MLARM course.



Specialist C. Elijah Spencer

An MLARM instructor coaches a student during an MTT in Afghanistan.

force in the world. This is especially true in urban environments where short range marksmanship is essential. In this environment, most battlefield actions begin to culminate when there are effective fires on critical targets. For the individual Soldier and fire team, their marksmanship often determines if they survive and win. Our nation depends on them to win, and in the 10th Mountain Division (LI) we are training them to win by developing master trainers using our Light Fighter School.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that "every Soldier is a Warrior." In the 10th Mountain Division, every Warrior is also a rifleman, but success on today's battlefield requires more than just marksmanship skills. Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show that in order for our Soldiers to survive, succeed, and dominate in urban environments they require a mastery of short range battle (SRB) skills that include combatives, breaching, and short range marksmanship.

In America's Army, the Soldier's ability to hit what he shoots at remains one of the most significant factors that make our Army the most lethal



Photo courtesy of the Light Fighter School, Fort Drum, NY

The combatives taught during the MLARM course focus on proper ways to subdue enemy combatants while operating with full body gear and organic equipment.

The 10th Mountain Division Light Fighter School teaches all of these vital skills using a three-week program of instruction conducted by top quality instructors under realistic conditions – the Mountain Leader Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (MLARM) course.

The 10th Mountain Division captured this new requirement for advanced, multi-unit marksmanship and SRB training in “The Way Ahead,” its vision for the division’s transformation. “The Way Ahead” establishes six goals, each with a set of supporting objectives that ensure the 10th Mountain Division’s successful transformation into modular, capabilities-based formations capable of executing full spectrum operations as part of an integrated joint force. Two of the supporting objectives in this document are directly tied to meeting the marksmanship and SRB demands placed on every Soldier in the division: “Train all Soldiers to employ small arms with a high level of precision, lethality, and confidence” and also to “serve as the Army’s proponent for advanced marksmanship and conventional urban operations, develop associated equipment requirements, and promulgate the TTPs

across the Army” in these areas.

Our MLARM course is the primary means for achieving these two transformation objectives. The course provides 10th Mountain Soldiers and leaders the skill sets necessary for success on today’s battlefield, and similar training needs to be available to all units across the Army to fully prepare them to defeat the adaptive enemy we face in the war on terrorism. The current course evolved from the Mountain Leaders Close Combat Course, which had existed since 1999, to meet the demands of the evolving war on terrorism. In March 2003, the Light Fighter School implemented the MLARM course that provides additional focus on training leaders and developing master trainers in the areas of advanced marksmanship and SRB, while incorporating the conditions our Soldiers and leaders face in the war on terrorism.

The result is a 21-day, live-fire intensive, train-the-trainer course designed for squad leaders through platoon leaders. Specifically, the course focuses on TTPs for advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) and Urban Operations. The ultimate goal of the course is for the graduates to return to

their units and perform duties as subject matter experts for team, squad, and platoon level training in these areas. Each platoon in the 10th Mountain Division is required to have a MLARM certified NCO who is responsible for teaching the TTPs to the other Soldiers in his platoon. This has rapidly increased the lethality and survivability of all our formations in every type of 10th Mountain Division unit.

The instructors of the Light Fighter School teach the MLARM course in three successive phases that build upon each other. The course starts with a five-day ARM phase. The skills learned in the first phase establish the most important fundamentals of advanced marksmanship and incorporate the latest advances in equipment, technology, and techniques. It begins with the principles of shooting and covers everything from ballistics to target analysis to the M-68 Close Combat Optic. This phase also includes employing limited visibility aiming systems such as the AN/PEQ 2A Target Pointer Illuminator/Aiming Light and the AN/ PAC-4C Laser Aiming Module. Emphasis is placed on shooting, grouping, zeroing, and known distance field fire. On the final day of this phase, the course requires the students to qualify on the known distance qualification course and to take a written exam on all of the ARM material.

The second phase of MLARM focuses on short range marksmanship. Instructors teach students the various quick and reflexive fire techniques that include stationary, moving, and alternate positions. During this phase the student to instructor ratio is one-to-one, helping to reinforce proper technique and develop proper muscle memory. Another important segment of this phase is the 14 hours of MOUT-related combatives. These combatives are different from the basic combatives found in FM 21-150. The combatives taught at MLARM focus on proper ways to subdue enemy combatants while operating with full body gear and organic equipment. The students quickly learn during their force-on-force exercises the repercussions of not using the proper combative techniques they were taught. Furthermore, these combatives are techniques that are relevant to 10th Mountain Soldiers in an urban environment

when deployed in support of the war on terrorism. The second phase ends with a SRM qualification and hands-on performance evaluation.

The final phase of MLARM is the short range battle phase – the most realistic and demanding of all three phases. During this third phase of training, students learn to properly conduct mechanical, shotgun, and demolition breaches. The cadre then form the students into fire teams and begin MOUT offensive operations that include extensive live firing in a single team, multi-room environment as well as a multi-team, multi-room environment. Starting with the basics, instructors teach room clearing, hallways, stairs, and use of verbal and nonverbal commands. Students build on the training at the squad level and on Day 19 they conduct a squad assault with live demolitions and simunitions where the instructors evaluate them in various leadership positions. This phase concludes with a written and hands-on examination.

MLARM's program of instruction is driven by the TTPs of proponent agencies such as the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit and 75th Ranger Regiment. The MLARM instructors receive training on a yearly basis on the most current TTPs these organizations employ to aid them in refining our course. The instructors further refine the POI based on the combat experience the 10th Mountain Division (LI) has from our operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and from their mobile training team

The 10th Mountain Division's MLARM course directly improves the marksmanship and SRB capabilities of the division as it transforms to meet our responsibilities in the war on terrorism. The end result will be that every Soldier in the division becomes a more lethal individual and fire team member equipped with the skills necessary to succeed and survive on the battlefield.

experiences in theater. For example, during an MTT to Afghanistan in February 2004, the instructors incorporated the effects of altitude on ballistics. They have since added this impact to the course instruction.

All MLARM instructors are graduates of the MLARM course. They range in grade from E6 to E7 and were successful squad leaders and/or platoon sergeants. The student to instructor ratio further strengthens this course as each class size is no more than 24 Soldiers with nine instructors. This provides students the opportunity to receive detailed attention not readily available in other training venues in the Army. However, the student to instructor ratio does not ensure that all students graduate. In fact, roughly 30 percent of each class fails to graduate — most fail the known distance qualification,

which further highlights the importance of meeting the marksmanship standard.

The 10th Mountain Division's MLARM course directly improves the marksmanship and SRB capabilities of the division as it transforms to meet our responsibilities in the war on terrorism. The 10th Mountain Division understands the importance of properly training Soldiers and leaders to succeed on today's battlefield – and MLARM is meeting those requirements. MLARM is providing advanced rifle marksmanship and SRB instruction to leaders using the most current equipment and aiming devices, and at the same time it reminds Soldiers of the importance of the marksmanship fundamentals in an urban environment while fighting an adaptive and versatile enemy. Most importantly, the course is providing this training to leaders from all of our units, not just our infantry units. Although it will take time, the end result will be that every Soldier in the division becomes a more lethal individual and fire team member equipped with the advanced marksmanship and SRB skills necessary to succeed and survive on the battlefield.

Additional information on MLARM and the 10th Mountain Division's Light Fighter School can be found at www.drums.army.mil/lightftr/LFS-home.htm




Photo courtesy of the Light Fighter School, Fort Drum, NY

A 10th Mountain Division Soldier subdues another Soldier during training as part of the Light Fighter School's MLARM course.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Coss is currently the G3, 10th Mountain Division (Light) and supervises the Light Fighter School. He formerly commanded the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

Captain Adam Sawyer is an assistant G3, Training Officer, 10th Mountain Division and coordinates Light Fighter School scheduling and resources. He formerly served as an infantry platoon leader and company executive officer with the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska.

First Sergeant Scott Baughn is currently the first sergeant of the 10th Mountain Division Light Fighter School. He formerly served as a platoon sergeant in A Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division.



DEPLOYING THE FORCE

CAPTAIN JOSEPH CLABURN

The Global War on Terrorism requires that we sustain a force in several different areas of responsibility (AORs) around the world. Preparing units for deployment is the first and most essential task that must be completed before they can begin their missions. Since September 11, 2001, the Army and its sister branches have been on a continuous rotation of personnel, equipment, logistics, and sustainment packages. Before these forces are able to operate in their theater and as long as the Army continues to increase the rate of deployments, a constant preparation for deployment must be established for every unit. The baseline for success should result in a deployment shell that exhibits every mode of transportation available for a unit to travel outside of the continental U.S.

Concept and Execution

As the unit movement officer (UMO) for an infantry battalion with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for two years which included deployments as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, I had the opportunity to plan and execute every means of transportation that exists, and in the following paragraphs I will discuss the lessons learned along the way.

Before September 11th, specifically in the 101st Airborne Division, we used terms such as Rapid Deployment Force, Division Readiness Brigade, and N-hour sequence for deployment notification. But post-September 11th, there are now different ways to deploy the force. For the most part, units are being given notification of deployment months in advance, which has drastically changed the sequence to which units prepare to deploy.

Warning orders for a possible deployment are all apart of the division X-hour sequence which precedes the brigade and battalion-level N-hour sequences. The constraint of a 36 or 18-hour deployment cycle with a detailed and systematic N-hour sequence is now replaced with warning orders months in advance. These sequences help leaders to initiate certain decisions, enable staff officers to develop actions in the military decision-making process, and begin troop leading procedures. These steps can help to identify certain needs such as obtaining maps of the potential area of operation or requesting important deployment equipment. Upon notification of the initial warning order, units should start this sequence, even six months out from deploying. If units continue to use the N-hour sequence, staff and company commanders must understand the sequence in order to assign tasks and identify responsibilities.

Even at the beginning of U.S. deployments to Afghanistan in late 2001, conventional forces were given notice of a possible deployment weeks before receiving deployment orders. Units had time to deeply prepare and revise the very documents, personnel issues, and loads that should have already been done prior to the alert notification. From that point on, the force that was designated as the "readiness unit" truly had to be ready. There couldn't be anymore magic hand waves or units just "checking the block" to make it appear that they were ready.

Documents and Systems

Prior to any deployment, regardless if it is just to the National Training Center or as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, every unit must have an accurate automated unit equipment list (AUEL)

entered into the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS) computer system. This list is supposed to be a representation of what the unit has available on the property books and helps the unit determine what equipment is needed for the deployment. Specifically, units must concentrate their efforts into transitioning the AUEL into a very accurate and detailed deployment equipment list (DEL) where they input data about the vehicles and equipment. This list has to be completed prior to any unit assuming or acknowledging deployment readiness. To save time and make the deployment data correct, unit movement officers must focus their attentions on the dimensional and weight data for every piece of equipment being transported. Without this information, or by inputting inaccurate data into the system, a unit could misrepresent the allocated lift or movement requirements to move the equipment.

Once a unit has been verified for deployment and the U.S. Transportation Command and Division Transportation Office begin to allocate the appropriate movement requirements for the unit, the DEL data is entered into the Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) to assign the deploying force with a unit identification code (UIC). The problem with this system is that it is not compatible with the TC-ACCIS system; therefore, the data must be produced in a different format and takes time away from the unit movement officer. Depending on the size and type of deployment, it could take a unit movement officer several hours to complete and compile the data to submit. At this point, JOPES (Joint Operations Planning and Execution System) operators at the higher level confirm the data in the system and begin to resource the transportation requirements.

The lack of a centralized computer system to do this job created problems in having true visibility of the units' allocated movement requirements. This problem could be solved if there was one universal tracking code instead of the Army using transportation control numbers and the U.S. Air Force using UICs. Additionally, if the data is not entered into the computer systems accurately from the very

beginning, it is easy for this process to become inaccurate and inevitably creates problems from the lowest level to the highest level.

Heights, weights, dimensions, and specific data about the loads have to be accurate for these systems to produce the true picture for what the deploying force needs to meet its requirement. Because of the different data formats of each of the systems listed above, it can be very easy to "lose" equipment in the system or report inaccurate data. The incompatibility of computer systems and the inability to transfer data from one system to the other continues to create problems in this system and many others of the deployment systems.

Containers

Depending on the mode of transportation, the military van (MILVAN), ISU-90 and ISU-60 shipping containers, and the quadruple container (quadcon) are the primary containers used for both continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) deployments. The quadcons can be shipped individually or linked with three others to make one unit,

and are now becoming the most widely used containers that the Army uses. The USAF 463-L pallet was used primarily for unit tuff boxes and baggage. Wood sideboards were constructed for pallets that were pre-packed for A and B-bags which drastically increased the number of bags that were stacked to the maximum height limit. There is no reason that the pallet with this baggage cannot be packed prior to a unit becoming active in the deployment order.

Designed primarily for sea movement and to replace the very old MILVAN container, the quadcon can be packed with specific items, grouped together up to a 20-foot length, shipped to its destination, and then easily broken apart and transported by truck to the receiving unit. However, the problems with this container were visible during the initial deployment of units from the 101st Airborne for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although the container works great to group hazardous cargo together without having to jeopardize nonhazardous cargo being shipped in the same container, early use of this container showed that it is very manpower heavy when it comes time to group the four containers into one by using the couplings.

Additionally, the single quadcon is easily shipped in the back of a truck using tie-downs, or grouped together it travels perfectly by commercial line haul, rail car, and sea lift. Units must ensure that the proper equipment to move the quadcon trains is available at the final destination such as the equivalent to a 10,000-pound forklift.

The majority of the air load personnel from the USAF did not have experience with the containers, so there was some confusion about how to tie the 20-foot configuration down to the USAF pallets. Every loadmaster for the aircraft had a different standard for the tie-down of the quadcons to the pallets. The quadcons required at least 24 10,000 pound chains to tie down to the pallet which had to be provided by the deploying unit. I do not



Sergeant Tami Lambert

Soldiers hook up an ISU-90 shipping container to UH-60 Blackhawk during a training exercise. The ISU-90 is one of the primary shipping containers used for deployments.

recommend this container for use during air mobility movements because it took up too much room in the aircraft, was extremely heavy, and often times got stuck in the roller system of the aircraft. The containers had to be placed on a pallet lift and placed onto the aircraft, using the center roller ADS system on the C-17, which drastically cut down on the number of pallet positions available for other pieces of equipment. The actual number of containers could be doubled if units used the more “air-friendly” ISU-90, with the built-in pallet locks on the bottom of the container.

The other area of concern came when the appropriate lift assets weren’t available at the receiving airfield or forward operating base to move the 20-foot lengths. Certain lift equipment is required for units to separate the containers from the couplings and transport them individually. At one point during the 101st deployment to Afghanistan, several Air Force refueling bases identified that they did not have the material handling equipment (MHE), such as the k-loaders, to handle the large quadcon trains. The C-5 aircraft loaded at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, had to be downloaded at airfields in Europe and loaded onto C-17 aircraft to compensate for the smaller airfields in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The lack of proper MHE became an issue when multiple C-5 aircraft could not download the containers once they had arrived in Europe and resulted in timely delays. Due to this significant delay at several air bases, Air Mobility Command personnel requested that the containers be placed on individual pallets at the aerial point of embarkation (APOE) in order to increase the speed of the transload process.

Prior to any deployment, regardless of what container is being used, units can save time and preparation in planning to preload all of the equipment that they plan to take into theater with them. This includes office computers, manuals, and extra BII/arms room equipment. Load cards designating specific loads to containers can be done in advance; further, the unit must recognize that certain hazardous cargo or sensitive items may need additional paperwork for the movement. Specific attention should be placed on the type of movement, MHE, and other transportation assets available at the final destination to sufficiently allocate the proper container to be used.

HAZMAT

For all types of movement in or out of the United States, the certification to transport hazardous material (HAZMAT) can make or break the unit. A unit must focus critical attention on sending personnel to the two-week Department of Defense’s transportation of HAZMAT course. Personnel designated to attend this course should be stabilized at the unit for at least one year to provide the unit with maximum coverage of this skill. To provide continuous coverage of this skill, certified personnel should be designated all the way to company level so that the work load of an entire battalion is not felt by one person as the certifier.

For all the types of movement, a Shipper’s Declaration of Dangerous Goods (SDDG) and the DD 836 are required when shipping any hazardous material. The SDDG forms can only be purchased by the civilian company Labelmasters and can cost the unit money if preparation and experience are not emphasized.

Unit movement officers should photo copy blank SDDG’s for practice and to simulate the hazards in certain containers or loads and place them for future use. The DD836 is another declaration form for hazardous materials, but this form can be printed from Form Flow and can be reproduced with little effort or cost to the unit. A hazardous material “smart book” should be kept at company level handy to help with quick references of the most frequently used hazardous material used by the unit. When the word comes for units to deploy, these practice forms will be easy enough to use to fill out on the correct and actual form with the four carbon copy originals. Only the forms with the red-striped edges should be used for real world deployments. Units must also be prepared to add to their deployment package several packets of these forms with them into theater for their return trip and for operational or strategic flights in the AOR. In conjunction with the SDDG and DD836, a diplomatic clearance sheet will also have to be completed for international travel. The diplomatic clearance forms will be a compilation of the hazardous material on one aircraft traveling over the international borders of another country. Some flights experienced significant delays in travel (2-8 days) due to a denial of diplomatic clearance for U.S. Air Force flights flying to or over certain countries. A majority of the prolonged delayed flights had some type of Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosive (such as rockets, C4, or powder container projectiles) on the aircraft.

In addition to preparing the SDDG, units must also ensure that the proper shipping labels are placed on vehicles, pallets, and containers. The hazardous shipment labels can also be bought through Labelmasters, and units must ensure that a substantial amount of labels are in stock since every mode of transportation requires labels for shipment. Again, it is critical to ensure the properly trained personnel are certifying these loads since the improper labeling of loads is punishable by federal law with fines up to \$10,000. Special consideration needs to be paid to such items as generators, Class VIII items, compressed cans (such as paint or maintenance lubricants), propane tanks (Coleman stoves), and Class IX.

Moving by line haul

Moving the unit by line haul from the home station is one of the easiest moving modes. The majority of the focus for units should be placed on the transportation of their containers and ensuring that the proper personnel (UMOs, supply reps, executive officers) are present during the loading and inspecting of the equipment. All of the vehicles being shipped by line haul are traditionally stripped to the bare minimum to reduce the risk of equipment being stolen during transportation. For this reason, all of the accompanying equipment to vehicles and loads should be placed in containers for movement. Movement by truck doesn’t have the constraints of shipping hazardous cargo like the other modes of transportation. Loads containing the equivalent to hazardous material “residue” do not require the SDDG for shipment. Depending on the type of hazard, shipments only have to be certified by schooled HAZMAT personnel if the substance exceeds a certain weight (1,000 kg or more depending on the hazardous material being shipped) or amount. For instance, empty

Gerry cans have to be certified if flying by military aircraft, but an entire container full of the cans does not constitute a hazardous shipment by commercial line haul. For this reason again, it is necessary that personnel making the decisions for the moving unit must be experienced and qualified to ship such material to avoid wasted time and planning preparation.

For containers holding sensitive or critical pieces of equipment, a special request is submitted through the transportation office of each departing unit for a truck with the satellite-tracking device. The use of these satellite-tracking devices is the only way that the sensitive items should be shipped since the truck drivers are qualified for such movements and the driver/company sign for the containers prior to departing the home station.

Units must ensure that a company representative is on site at the line haul loading dock because vehicles are typically loaded by an outload team that does not pay attention to bumper number specific to each unit. Load planners for these line hauls are only worried about the type of vehicle and not who it belongs to it, so the visibility of each unit's vehicles will be lost once the trucks depart the home station. It is important to not overload the containers with items that won't be able to be moved with the organic vehicles in the unit. This is the result of there not being enough allocated MHE available at the point of debarkation and allows the unit to quickly download the containers and move forward to an operating base or staging area.

Moving By Rail

Movement by rail car is significantly faster for a unit to outload because a majority of U.S. Army installations keep a designated number of rail cars on station and have significant rail operating facilities. Some of the railhead facilities have the ability to operate 24 hours a day, making the constant deployment of a brigade or a division much easier than any of the other deployment modes. Regardless of how many times U.S. Army units seem to use the rail system to deploy throughout the United States for the Joint Readiness Training Center or the National Training



Lori Bultman

Soldiers unload M113 armored personnel carriers from rail cars prior to an exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas. The rail system is often used for deployments to the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

Center, we somehow always run into problems. Consistent with all of the other modes of transportation, the lack of trained personnel seems to be the biggest major shortfall for this system.

As easy as it is to deploy forces through this type of mode, it can be a very difficult process to go through, all the way up to getting the pieces of equipment on the rail cars, if the personnel aren't trained and consistent standards aren't enforced. Sensitive items on vehicles must be taken off and stored in containers due to the lack of security during the time of travel. In my experience, units were required to strip their vehicles to the lowest configuration and either store the pieces in a container or attach them to the vehicle using banding material. The vehicles were loaded up with as much equipment as possible to make room for other equipment in the containers, create more room on the rail cars, and to get as much equipment down to the port rapidly.

Members from civilian railways company came down to help with units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and insisted that certain units use a specific type of banding material. This was the first step of many that became issues in the 101st Airborne Division's deployment. The type of banding material seemed to change after

units had already spent thousands of dollars to buy one type and spent the time to apply it to the vehicles. The result was that units had to request additional funding to go down to local hardware stores to buy the appropriate banding material for the movement. This resulted in several vehicles failing the initial inspection and thousands of dollars wasted on the wrong material. Although military manuals specifically outlining rail requirements have been published, the use of CSX personnel on site as subject matter experts was something to sustain, but changing standards to how the load-out is to be conducted cannot be changed at the last minute. Recognizing problems early in this certain case can save units time and a significant amount of money.

Vehicles with secondary loads were only limited by the height to which they could be put on the railcar. Units maximized the use of secondary loads and traveled with most of their containers on the back of their medium and heavy trucks. For this, the $\frac{3}{4}$ inch wire rope sufficed for tying down the containers to the vehicles. However, it is essential for the DEL to report that the item has a secondary load on it as well as having an adjusted height and weight for the vehicle. This is important for the LOGMAR label when the vehicle gets down to the

shipping yard so that both pieces of equipment are accounted for appropriately. The John Deere GATORS were also a problem since they are too long to put onto the back of trucks, they hang off of the sides, and transporting them from the port to a FOB could be a problem if it is a considerable distance away. One solution was to load the GATORS on civilian bought trailers that could also be pulled by the Gators when they were downloaded. Another way to load the small utility vehicle was to secondary load one GATOR into the back of trucks which doesn't maximize the load capacity of the trucks transporting them.

Moving by Sea

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Army has focused much attention on the ability to deploy units using sea vessels from both the U.S. Navy and from the civilian maritime fleet. During the deployment phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army units were rail loading their vehicles and containers to the nearest seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) for sea load across the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Army personnel were assigned to download the vehicles from the trains at the shipyard, but at that point the vehicles became the responsibility of the shipping personnel. To keep accurate control of the equipment, vehicles and containers were equipped with RF tracking tags. These tags are tracked when a receiver and transmitter are in proximity so the result was that the equipment could be tracked from the home station along the railroad as the pieces of equipment passed certain transmitters along the way. The problem was that the transmitters could also keep track of the equipment while sitting at the port, but once the vessel got outside of the transmitting distance of the RF tag, the piece of equipment became untraceable until the vessel reached a

port with another receiver and transmitter. This caused significant challenges to the units on the receiving side since there was no true visibility of equipment on multiple ships. It seemed that there was no one from the units keeping an eye on specific pieces of equipment and the personnel loading the vessels grabbed vehicle type's specific to their own load plans and gave no consideration to priority of movement for each unit. A partial list of the equipment on the ships was generated, but after further review, the lists were only 75-percent accurate most of the time. In addition to units not knowing what ship their equipment was on, it took a significant amount of time about 20-30 days for these ships to reach the ports in the Persian Gulf, and only limited space and resources were available to receive multiple ships. After multiple ships started to arrive at the SPOD, many other vessels were required to sit off of the coast. Before a vessel could enter the dock area to download, it had to wait for one ship to clear the docks before it could enter and download itself. Even still, units were unsure that specific or mission critical items would be on the next vessel.

In respect to hazardous material, U.S. Coast Guard regulations have to be enforced, and it is essential for units to understand the rules and regulations for such movements since the USCG falls under the Department of Transportation and not the Department of Defense. Containers holding hazardous material must be inspected and certified to be sea worthy to protect the items inside. Vehicles must be reduced to their lowest configuration to maximize the ships' multiple levels, and the striped items must be stored in containers which are readily available, so that vehicles could immediately travel from the port of debarkation the their respective staging areas. Due to the decreased need of a quick reaction force and the increased predictability of deployments, future units in the U.S. Army will deploy by sea vessel. Since movement by sea is



A Bradley fighting vehicle is loaded aboard the USNS Gordon in Kuwait. With the increased predictability of deployments, more units may move equipment by sea vessel. Since movement by sea is significantly cheaper than air mobility and has the flexibility to travel anywhere in the world, the use of U.S. Navy and civilian maritime vessels will be greatly increased, while the use of intercontinental travel with military aircraft will decrease.

Commander Randall Ramian,
USN



Kaye Richey

Airmen load a pallet onto a C130. The key to success for a unit to quickly and efficiently move through the air deployment process is to have knowledgeable and experienced personnel to prepare the unit.

significantly cheaper than air mobility and has the flexibility to travel anywhere in the world, the use of U.S. Navy and civilian maritime vessels will be greatly increased, while the use of intercontinental travel with military aircraft will decrease.

Moving by Air

Moving a unit by strategic air seems to be the biggest beast to take on upon receipt of deployment orders when the operations orders come to conduct a deployment. Among the standard paperwork that is required to be filled out for all the other deployments such as load cards, SDDG's, DD836's, and packing lists the challenge of working with another branch of service to move a unit is difficult and requires even more tedious paperwork on the part of the unit movement officers.

The first hurdle is ensuring the proper personnel are trained on the right computer systems and that they are familiar with the sequence of USAF deployments. A large majority of the "frustrated loads" and delays on the flight line, or in the process, are primarily due to inconsistent standards by personnel not trained properly for their job. Like all things, interpretation of the manuals seems to be the law of the land during exercises that do not involve the people who help to enforce those standards. The deployment process for units moving by air must have a priority for schooling, and this training must be supported by USAF personnel who directly influence the movement of units during deployment. This ensures that everyone involved in future deployments is speaking the right terminology and enforcing the same standards.

Several installations offer Air Mobility Command Load Planner's Courses to assist unit movement officers in developing strategic lift load plans. During the time that I attended the course, the class learned how to create these load plans using cut outs, calculators, and countless formulas to determine center balance and maximum capacity of aircraft loads. Once I arrived at my unit, I received the Automated Air Load Planning System (AALPS) computer which helps assist the UMO's in determining lift restrictions and easily identifying load plans for aircraft. The trial by error on this system is long and tedious since the AUEL or DEL cannot be downloaded into the computer system but instead each individual piece of equipment must be entered into the AALPS system. Once this is done, each piece of equipment must be planned on the designated airframe and moved in conjunction with weight and squared feet restrictions. This system is easy to use once the DEL has been built into the database and is extremely acceptable for when units have to move around a wide AOR by military aircraft. However, due to the computer system not being compatible with the U.S. Air Force's two other load planning systems (CALM and GATES); the AALPS system is useful only to itself. A large amount of time can be saved with the system if there was a way to take the information from the units DEL in TC-ACCIS and input it into the AALPS system. The plus to the system is that the load plans are accurate and can be manipulated easily in the system to help with last minute load changes, frustrated loads that have to be "bumped" from one aircraft to another, and moving the pieces on the aircraft to maximize seats for passengers. Additionally, the system allows the user to print out a complete list of equipment in the DEL by Unit Identification Codes, Transportation Control Numbers, and Unit Line Numbers. But again, all this information has to be typed into the system prior to the use of this capability.

When units move by air, it is important for every piece of equipment to go through a pre-inspection to verify load cards, certify hazardous material, ensure vehicle serviceability, and complete the proper paperwork. A large majority of mistakes can be detected prior to the vehicle or equipment arriving at the ADACG/JI line where the final inspection is done. By the time that the items pass through the stations of the Joint Inspection line, UMOs will only have minor adjustments to weight and dimensional data. Having to create this information on the JI line only delays the unit's ability to quickly deploy by air and places extreme constraints on time for the inspecting USAF personnel.

The key to success for a unit to quickly and efficiently move through the air deployment process is to have multiple personnel knowledgeable and experienced to prepare the unit. The biggest setbacks from this process come from individuals who do not understand the standard and do not allow themselves the proper time to prepare for the deployment. Preparation and load out exercises are critical in ensuring accuracy in load plans for vehicles and containers as well as ensuring that the proper paperwork has been done for hazardous and nonhazardous material.

Lessons Learned

Every unit in the U.S. Army, down to company level, should have a unit movement officer responsible for keeping an accurate

and detailed deployment book on hand. This deployment book must contain every document needed for every possible mode of movement that the unit could be required to execute. Every UMO must keep a current copy of the property book, a copy of the AUEL and DEL, load cards for the vehicles and containers, and HAZMAT paperwork for any and all possible scenarios for the transportation of dangerous cargo. This book should be constantly changed based on the type of mission and area of responsibility that the unit might be deploying. For instance, the load required for a HMMWV shipped by air to the Middle East will be drastically different from a HMMWV shipped completely stripped on a rail car to JRTC.

Some installations offer a Strategic Deployability School and some installations even offer the two-week DoD certified HAZMAT course which allows personnel to sign for shipping hazardous materials for all modes of transportation. The focus for every unit should be the qualification of several personnel to reduce the workload of paper work and responsibility onto one person and enable coverage at several different locations during the deployment process. These personnel should have at least one year of retainability in the unit to allow time for experience and continuity. Because of the vast number of computer systems and paperwork that go into deploying, a designated deployment readiness team should be established with the assigned OIC (usually the S3-Air for a

battalion) so that standards and continuity throughout the lower units is consistent. It is recommended that a MTOE change occur in units to allow the position of a designated Assistant S3 and a separate S-3 Air.

Before a unit departs to the theater of operations, UMO's for each unit should request to have the LOGMAR labels printed off for the return trip to home of station. If the proper computer system is not available at the POD in a different area of the world, unit movement officers will find themselves hand writing the labels for their equipment. The bar code transportation control number will never change for the piece of equipment and data, such as weight and dimensional data, can be crossed out and corrected without having to reprint a new label. Restrictions for this request will be dependent upon the number of units deploying and the resource funding to complete this task.

Airflow for military aircraft is unpredictable. I suggest that the chain of command split up between several aircraft so that any delays experienced along the way does not affect the command and control of elements that may arrive before them. All of the designated aircraft chalk leaders should travel with a communications card specifically with telephone numbers and pertinent e-mails in order to communicate with the deployment operations cell or the rear detachment back at home station to maintain visibility of delayed flights.

When the data for the TPFDD is

produced, it is critical for units to emphasize the square feet required instead of weight. It seemed that the focus for the air force USAF transportation personnel was on how many tons a unit had to move without giving consideration to how big or small the pieces of equipment were. The logic for allocating aircraft was that if the deploying unit had a specific number of tons to move, the USAF would take that maximum weight for each aircraft and continue to add aircraft until the total tonnage was met. The problem with this is that the larger pieces of equipment take up more space inside the aircraft, resulting from the aircraft running out of room before meeting the maximum weight limit. Aircraft were flown completely filled based on square foot, but only met 60 or 70 percent of its total weight capacity. This resulted in the U.S. Air Force under-allocating the number of aircraft to move the unit and in units having to justify specific load plans on aircraft in order to receive more flights. This further slowed the deployment process and only resulted in bitter cross-talk between branches when timelines were not met and misallocation was factored.

The 101st Airborne Division utilized civilian contractors to help facilitate the movement of units deploying from Fort Campbell. These deployment support teams (DSTs) were first used during the redeployment of units returning from Afghanistan and were again utilized during the deployment to Iraq. The DST's were assigned to each of the units to create a centralized standard for the way that units were deploying. Additionally, these personnel were to be trained in specific areas of deployment to assist the unit movement officers in their deployment process. Based on my experience, the use of these DST personnel was not at all critical in the deployment or redeployment of units. The money to pay and train these personnel could very easily be saved on the proper training of unit personnel throughout the division.

Captain Joseph Claburn served as the battalion movement officer for the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from April 2001 until May 2003. While in this position, Claburn completed deployments as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.



Specialist Lorie Jewell

Soldiers file off a C-130 at Esler Air Field in Louisiana.

BOOK REVIEWS



Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill. By Bill McWilliams. Naval Institute Press, 2004. 494 Pages. \$29.95, Hardcover. Reviewed by Colonel Mike Davino.

The Korean War is often called the "Forgotten War." However, in truth, the war of maneuver that made up the first year of the war has been the subject of many excellent books. The stationary, or "outpost war," that was fought from 1951 to 1953 has received far less attention. For example, the U.S. Army's official history of the war devotes two volumes to the first year, but just part of a single volume to the combat operations conducted during the final two years of the war. Bill McWilliams' book, *On Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill*, is a close study of one of the most brutal battles fought during that period.

Pork Chop Hill may be familiar to some readers as the subject of SLA Marshall's book and the subsequent movie starring Gregory Peck. That book and movie deal with the April 1953 battle for the outpost on Pork Chop, so named because of its resemblance to a pork chop when depicted on a topographic map. McWilliams, a retired Air Force colonel and 1955 graduate of West Point, reviews that earlier battle as well as the overall strategic situation. Of particular note is his account of the efforts by the South Korean president, Syngman Rhee, to undermine U.S. negotiations to conclude an armistice agreement with the North Koreans and Chinese. Rhee ordered his Soldiers to release thousands of North Korean prisoners as well as prohibited South Koreans to continue to work for the United Nations Command. His actions prolonged the fighting and are a vivid reminder that the challenges associated with coalition warfare are nothing new.

McWilliams' recounting of the organization, training, operations and

leadership of the 7th Infantry Division provides a fascinating look inside the U.S. Army of 1953. The 7th Division, with its attached Ethiopian and Colombian battalions along with more than 2,000 attached South Korean Soldiers, was in itself, a mini-coalition. He explains the heavy pressure on the division's leadership to keep friendly casualties to a minimum and how leaders above division level severely limited the freedom of action of the division commander and his subordinates.

The real focus of this book is on the July 1953 battle in which regiments of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division fought against a Chinese enemy determined to seize the company-sized outpost on Pork Chop. McWilliams does a great job in describing this chaotic battle and the bravery of the Soldiers in the rifle companies and their supporting units that fought it. Using a combination of official records, letters written by Soldiers to family members, and interviews with survivors, he recreates the decentralized bunker-to-bunker fighting that characterized the numerous attacks and counterattacks. He examines in detail the decisions made at high levels of command that ultimately determined the outcome of the battle. And finally, in his section on the aftermath of Pork Chop, he puts it in the perspective of both history and the families of the fallen.

This is a great addition to the history of the Korean War. Infantrymen assigned to the brigade level and below should read this book as well as those infantrymen working in headquarters that are responsible for multinational operations. It will also be of interest to both students of the Korean War and those readers with a general interest in military history and ground combat.

Nuclear and Sri Lanka. Lieutenant Colonel Chandana Weerakoon, Godage International Publishers, No. 661, Maradana Road, Colombo 10, Sri Lanka. \$10. Reviewed by Russell A. Eno.

This paperback is well worth the nominal cost. Lieutenant Colonel Weerakoon — a major at the time the book was written — is a graduate of the Infantry Captains' Career Course at Fort Benning, and has effectively discussed the issue of nuclear proliferation from the perspective of a small nation in the Indian Ocean, between the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. His topic, relevant enough if only viewed in light of the potential secondary effects of a nuclear exchange between major world powers, has assumed even greater urgency now that India and Pakistan now boast their own nuclear capabilities. Given the implications of the global war on terror and the threat of nuclear materials falling into terrorists' hands, it requires little imagination to understand the importance of maintaining in that region stable governments whose interests and foreign policy goals are congruent with those of the United States.

LTC Weerakoon does a good job of outlining the backgrounds of various nations' nuclear capabilities, focusing on those of India and Pakistan because any effects of such weapons would quickly and irrevocably be felt in his own island nation. He uses the downwind effects of the Soviet Union's Chernobyl disaster as an example of what could befall Sri Lanka and nations along the Pacific Rim after a nuclear exchange. The author spends some time discussing the immediate and long-term effects of a nuclear detonation and offers extensive charts, tables, and diagrams to support his points.

The book is written in clear, concise English, and the occasional typographical error does not significantly detract from

either the book's readability or its relevance in today's highly-charged environment. The message the reader carries away is that — while major world powers have by and large come to grips with the need to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons — the smaller and potentially less stable members of the nuclear club will need supervision and incentives to forestall the world-wide catastrophe that we have been trying to prevent since the end of World War II. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the issue today is not so much whether we can once again confine him, but rather how we can best restrict his movements until he can once again be brought under control.

Nuclear and Sri Lanka is worth the read. Buy it.

***The Vietnam War in History, Literature, and Film.* By Mark Taylor. University of Alabama Press, 2003. 160 Pages, \$48.00 (Hardcover), \$22.95 (Softcover).** Reviewed by Command Sergeant Major James Clifford.

The Vietnam War in History, Literature, and Film is a survey of the Vietnam War depiction in contemporary and immediate postwar American films and books. The author provides six short chapters that succinctly divide the subject into digestible portions. Chapter 1 explains the difficulty in telling war stories. Specific to Vietnam, Taylor introduces readers to an approach to writing that seems tailor made for those bent upon presenting their preconceived ideas by twisting facts to fit their political agenda. This 'new journalism' as practiced by journalists and novelists gives credibility to a definition of truth where faithfulness to facts is less important than expression of the authors' perceptions and feelings.

"Heroes" is a dissection of the concept of heroes and bravery as represented by Army special operation forces with special emphasis on Robin Moore's 1965 book *The Green Berets* and John Wayne's movie of the same title. Green Berets represent all that was right, and all that was wrong, with the Vietnam War. Depending on one's frame of reference, the Green Beret was either a selfless hero that risked all to protect, guide, and nurture a helpless people

or a bloodthirsty savage that ruthlessly killed without remorse.

A second chapter focusing on movies takes on Oliver Stone's *JFK*. This film puts forth the premise that the President was assassinated by a conspiracy hatched to ensure that America stayed in Vietnam. In order to begin to accept such an accusation one must believe that Kennedy was about to pull America out of Vietnam. Mark Taylor uses critical excerpts from the movie, Stone's own statements, and the documentary record to cast serious doubt on that premise. He thoroughly destroys the credibility of *JFK* while at the same time lending credence to Stone's right to present his mangled view of the facts.

In a chapter on battles, the author uses Khe Sanh as an example of the slanted writing coming out of Vietnam. Several authors wrote books that misrepresented what happened there. One novel of the period was written so skillfully that some historians have since used it as a factual reference, perhaps not realizing that much of the book is a composite of events and participants.

Up to this point the book is a strong presentation that outlines the significant distortions in Vietnam writings. Anyone reading this book will approach any future works with a jaundiced eye from then on thanks to this author's insightful analysis. Had the author stopped at this point the book would have been an important contribution to Vietnam studies. In fact, the author includes a chapter that seems to be an unfocused search for a point. In "Villains" the author retells the story of American war crimes in the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai. His telling of the story lacks any significant reference to the history, literature, or film other than some discussion of contemporary journalistic reporting and polling data. Most of the chapter discusses the official report and later book on the incident authored by Lieutenant General William Peers.

In the final chapter, "Veterans," the author describes how America media and entertainment outlets bought into the stereotype picture of a burned out Vietnam veteran. He lightly compares and contrasts this picture with that of the World War II veteran. Veterans of that war were also

portrayed as being problem ridden although the depth of that stereotype was not as deep. Although the stereotype has been significantly debunked by the facts, large portions of American society still believe that Vietnam veterans were somehow more profoundly damaged than veterans of other wars.

The Vietnam War in History, Literature, and Film is billed as an interdisciplinary approach to the Vietnam War that clarifies the relationships between how that war is portrayed. Hardly. Rather than clarify anything, the book straddles the fence on the issue. The author skillfully outlines how much of the journalism, history, novels, and cinema related to Vietnam is politically motivated and designed to manipulate the audience into denying the truth and accepting unsupported conclusions that comply with the authors' preconceived ideas. The weakness of this book is that after all the analysis and discussion the author is still unable to present a conclusion other than to say that there is no conclusion, and that further study is needed. Well, who did not already know that? Did we not know that nearly every article, book, and movie of Vietnam was either a piece of conservative propaganda or liberal hatchet job? We did, and this book just restates the obvious. A second weakness is the author's granting validity to inaccurate portrayals of the war. The morale equivalency offered to those with an ax to grind about Vietnam is aggravating in the very least.

The real question, the important question, is not what contemporary or immediate postwar literature tells us. We already know that the work of that era will be worthless to future generations of Americans. The question we should be asking is, what does current literature and movies teach us about the Vietnam War 30 years after? One can only trust that those currently writing are not infected by the same anti-Vietnam fever as those writing a generation before. Hopefully someone is working on that and we won't have to wait another 30 or more years to get a legitimate answer. Additionally, we hope that a similar group of charlatans will not gain possession of our history in regard to our operations in Iraq.



Private Brandi Marshall

Specialist Martin Wicklock (left) and Sergeant James Diederich prepare to enter a house during an August 2004 mission in Iraq. The Soldiers are assigned to the New York Army National Guard's Company C, 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry Regiment.

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